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Message-ID: <CAEf4BzbgQrYDMma=NbW6A-qikA693eSnz9-RwjkF3xPLRE8qqg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 14:16:56 -0700
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-block@...r.kernel.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/10] capability: add any wrappers to test for multiple
caps with exactly one audit message
On Fri, Mar 15, 2024 at 11:41 AM Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk> wrote:
>
> On 3/15/24 10:45 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> >> +/**
> >> + * ns_capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect
> >> + * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
> >> + * @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first
> >> + * @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly
> >> + *
> >> + * Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior
> >> + * capabilities currently available for use, false if not.
> >> + *
> >> + * In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit
> >> + * message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted,
> >> + * or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not.
> >> + *
> >> + * The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
> >> + *
> >> + * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> >> + * assumption that it's about to be used.
> >> + */
> >> +bool ns_capable_any(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap1, int cap2)
> >> +{
> >> + if (cap1 == cap2)
> >> + return ns_capable(ns, cap1);
> >> +
> >> + if (ns_capable_noauditondeny(ns, cap1))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> + if (ns_capable_noauditondeny(ns, cap2))
> >> + return true;
> >> +
> >> + return ns_capable(ns, cap1);
> >
> > this will incur an extra capable() check (with all the LSMs involved,
> > etc), and so for some cases where capability is expected to not be
> > present, this will be a regression. Is there some way to not redo the
> > check, but just audit the failure? At this point we do know that cap1
> > failed before, so might as well just log that.
>
> Not sure why that's important - if it's a failure case, and any audit
> failure should be, then why would we care if that's now doing a bit of
> extra work?
Lack of capability doesn't necessarily mean "failure". E.g., in FUSE
there are at least few places where the code checks
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and based on that decides on some limit values
or extra checks. So if !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), operation doesn't
necessarily fail outright, it just has some more restricted resources
or something.
Luckily in FUSE's case it's singular capable() check, so capable_any()
won't incur extra overhead. But I was just wondering if it would be
possible to avoid this with capable_any() as well, so that no one has
to do these trade-offs.
We also had cases in production of some BPF applications tracing
cap_capable() calls, so each extra triggering of it would be a bit of
added overhead, as a general rule.
Having said the above, I do like capable_any() changes (which is why I
acked BPF side of things).
>
> I say this not knowing the full picture, as I unhelpfully was only CC'ed
> on two of the patches... Please don't do that when sending patchsets.
>
> --
> Jens Axboe
>
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