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Message-ID: <mb61p4jczix6t.fsf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 12:30:50 +0000
From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@...il.com>
To: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>, "David S. Miller"
 <davem@...emloft.net>, David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, Alexei
 Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
 Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Martin KaFai Lau
 <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, "Eduard
 Zingerman" <eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song
 <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>, John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, "KP
 Singh" <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo
 <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner
 <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov
 <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Jean-Philippe Brucker
 <jean-philippe@...aro.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v3] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com> writes:

> On Thu, 2024-03-21 at 12:08 +0000, Puranjay Mohan wrote:
>> With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer.
>> To
>> thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
>> for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset overflows and
>> turns into a userspace address, the BPF program might read that
>> memory if
>> the user has mapped it.
>> 
>> There are architectural features that prevent the kernel from
>> accessing
>> userspace memory, like Privileged Access Never (PAN) on ARM64,
>> Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP) on x86-64, Supervisor User
>> Memory access (SUM) on RISC-V, etc. But BPF should not rely on the
>> existence of these features.
>> 
>> Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses
>> and
>> skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.
>> 
>> The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
>> the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is
>> taken
>> as default.
>> 
>> The implementation is as follows:
>> 
>> REG_AX =  SRC_REG
>> if(offset)
>> 	REG_AX += offset;
>> REG_AX >>= 32;
>> if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
>> 	DST_REG = 0;
>> else
>> 	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);
>> 
>> Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
>> 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned
>> down
>> to a 4GB boundary before comparison.
>> 
>> The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB
>> are
>> skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much
>> larger
>> than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
>> correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
>> above the userspace.
>> 
>> Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
>> dereferencing an untrusted pointer:
>> 
>>   SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
>>   int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
>>   {
>>                 *(volatile long *)sk;
>>                 return 0;
>>   }
>> 
>>     BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
>>     ------------------              |           -----------------
>> 
>>   0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>>   -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> ----
>>   1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
>>   ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 >>= 32
>>   2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto
>> pc+2
>>   3: (95) exit                  \   \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>>                                  \      5: (05) goto pc+1
>>                                   \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
>>                                    \---------------------------------
>> -----
>>                                         7: (b7) r0 = 0
>>                                         8: (95) exit
>> 
>> As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra
>> instructions
>> are emitted.
>> 
>> Now, we analyse the same program after it has gone through the JITs
>> of
>> X86-64, ARM64, and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load
>> instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what
>> instrumentation
>> has been added around it.
>> 
>>                                 x86-64 JIT
>>                                 ==========
>>      JIT's Instrumentation                  Verifier's
>> Instrumentation
>>           (upstream)                               (This patch)
>>      ---------------------                  -------------------------
>> -
>> 
>>    0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)             0:   nopl  
>> 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
>>    5:   xchg   %ax,%ax                      5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
>>    7:   push   %rbp                         7:   push   %rbp
>>    8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp                    8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
>>    b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi               b:   mov   
>> 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
>>   -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> -----
>>    f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11         f:   mov    %rdi,%r10
>>   19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi                   12:   shr    $0x20,%r10
>>   1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a          16:   cmp    $0x8000,%r10
>>   1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11                   1d:   jbe   
>> 0x0000000000000025
>>   21:   add    $0x0,%r11              /--> 1f:   mov   
>> 0x0(%rdi),%rdi
>>   28:   jae    0x000000000000002e    /     23:   jmp   
>> 0x0000000000000027
>>   2a:   xor    %edi,%edi            /      25:   xor    %edi,%edi
>>   2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032  / /-------------------------------
>> -----
>>   2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi  ---/ /      27:   xor    %eax,%eax
>>   ---------------------------------/       29:   leave
>>   32:   xor    %eax,%eax                   2a:   ret
>>   34:   leave
>>   35:   ret
>> 
>> The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against
>> user
>> memory access. The implementation in this patch leads to a smaller
>> number of instructions being emitted. In the worst case the JIT will
>> emit 9 extra instructions and this patch decreases it to 7.
>> 
>>                                   ARM64 JIT
>>                                   =========
>> 
>>         No Intrumentation                       Verifier's
>> Instrumentation
>>            (upstream)                                  (This patch)
>>         -----------------                       ---------------------
>> -----
>> 
>>    0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30,
>> #0x0
>>    4:   nop                                  4:   nop
>>    8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
>>    c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30,
>> [sp, #-16]!
>>   10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
>>   14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20,
>> [sp, #-16]!
>>   18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22,
>> [sp, #-16]!
>>   1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26,
>> [sp, #-16]!
>>   20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28,
>> [sp, #-16]!
>>   24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
>>   28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
>>   2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25,
>> #0x0
>>   30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp,
>> #0x0
>>   34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> -----------
>>   38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0,
>> #0x0
>> -----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, #32
>>   3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10,
>> lsl #12
>>   40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls   
>> 0x0000000000000050
>>   44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--> 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
>>   48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b      
>> 0x0000000000000054
>>   4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
>>   50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------
>> ------------
>>   54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
>>   58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
>>   5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28,
>> [sp], #16
>>   60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26,
>> [sp], #16
>>   64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22,
>> [sp], #16
>>   68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20,
>> [sp], #16
>>   6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30,
>> [sp], #16
>>                                             70:   add     x0, x7,
>> #0x0
>>                                             74:   autiasp
>>                                             78:   ret
>>                                             7c:   nop
>>                                             80:   ldr     x10,
>> 0x0000000000000088
>>                                             84:   br      x10
>> 
>> There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This
>> will
>> become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).
>> 
>>                            RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
>>                            ==========
>> 
>>         No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
>>            (upstream)                      (This patch)
>>         -----------------           --------------------------
>> 
>>    0:   nop                            0:   nop
>>    4:   nop                            4:   nop
>>    8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
>>    c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
>>   10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
>>   14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
>>   18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>>   1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
>> --------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
>>   20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
>>   24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
>>   28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
>>   2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--> 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
>>   30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
>>                                 \     38:   li      a0, 0
>>                                  \------------------------------
>>                                       3c:   li      a5, 0
>>                                       40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
>>                                       44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
>>                                       48:   sext.w  a0, a5
>>                                       4c:   ret
>> 
>> There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.
>> 
>> Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
>> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@...ian.org>
>> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@...il.com>
>> ---
>> V2:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321101058.68530-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
>> Changes in V3:
>> - Return 0 from bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() in disabled case because it
>>   returns u64.
>> - Modify the check in verifier to no do instrumentation when
>> uaddress_limit
>>   is 0.
>> 
>> V1:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240320105436.4781-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
>> Changes in V2:
>> - Disable this feature on s390x.
>> ---
>>  arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c |  5 +++
>>  arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c  | 72 ++++------------------------------
>> --
>>  include/linux/filter.h       |  1 +
>>  kernel/bpf/core.c            |  9 +++++
>>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 30 +++++++++++++++
>>  5 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
>
> [...]
>  
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index 5aacb1d3c4cc..c131bee33ac3 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -2958,6 +2958,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_arena(void)
>>  	return false;
>>  }
>>  
>> +u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
>> +{
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
>> +	return TASK_SIZE;
>> +#else
>> +	return 0;
>> +#endif
>> +}
>> +
>
> How about the following?
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && \
>     defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE)
>
> Then we won't need to do anything for s390x explicitly.`

Thanks for the suggestion, I will use this in v4.

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