linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/kexec: do unconditional WBINVD in relocate

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Message-ID: <glorzobyf42wylp57izgiukbe33c6ez5mgiwxepgn6pt2h4lr3@aqdas5q75mcb>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 12:40:52 +0200
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	x86@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...el.com, bp@...en8.de, tglx@...utronix.de, 
	mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com, luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org, 
	rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, ashish.kalra@....com, chao.gao@...el.com, bhe@...hat.com, 
	nik.borisov@...e.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/kexec: do unconditional WBINVD in
 relocate_kernel()

On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 04:02:11PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 3/20/24 18:10, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 09:48:28AM +1300, Huang, Kai wrote:
> > > 
> > > > > Hi Tom,
> > > > > 
> > > > > I am not aware of kexec() support status for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests.
> > > > > Does patch 1 break them?
> > > > 
> > > > SNP guests can kexec with some patches that are currently in process
> > > > around shared to private memory conversions. ES guests can only kexec
> > > > with a single vCPU. There was a recent patch series to add support for
> > > > multiple vCPUs.
> > > > 
> > > > Patch #1 doesn't break either ES or SNP because we still have an IDT and
> > > > traditional kernel addressing in place, so the #VC can be handled.
> > > 
> > > How about plain SEV guest?
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Whereas patch #2 has switched to identity mapping and removed the IDT,
> > > > so a #VC causes a triple fault.
> > > 
> > > That makes sense.  Thanks.
> > > 
> > > Hi Kirill,
> > > 
> > > Does TDX guest have similar behaviour -- that WBINVD in stop_this_cpu() can
> > > be handled although it causes #VE, while WBINVD in relocate_kernel() will
> > > just triple fault the guest?
> > 
> > No. We never handle WBINVD #VE. Guest cannot handle WBINVD itself and the
> > only option is to ask host to do this. We cannot guarantee host will do
> 
> Is the WBINVD performed or ignored in that case?

We crash the guest if it tries to use WBINVD. There's no legitimate reason
for it.

> > anything useful with the request. I guess it can be potential attack
> > vector if host strategically ignores WBINVD to induce bad guest behaviour.
> 
> With SNP, memory is coherent so there isn't a need for a WBINVD within a
> guest and so issuing it should not be an issue whether the hypervisor
> performs the operation or not. I don't know what can happen in the case
> where, say, you have a non-coherent TDISP device attached or such, but that
> would be very unusual/unlikely.

Looks like SNP is in the same position as TDX.

> > And it is not good from host PoV either. If it does WBINVD on every guest
> > request we get guest->host DoS attack possibility.
> 
> Yeah, that can happen today, regardless of the type of VM running.
> 
> > 
> > Tom, I am curious, how do you deal with these problems?
> 
> If the WBINVD is being intercepted, then it will generate a #VC and we use
> the GHCB protocol to communicate that back to the hypervisor to handle.

I would argue that forwarding it to hypervisor is worse than crashing. It
gives false sense of doing something. Hypervisor is outside TCB and
considered hostile.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov