linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf v4] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 17:28:27 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
To: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@...il.com>,
 "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
 Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, Eduard Zingerman
 <eddyz87@...il.com>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
 Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
 John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
 Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
 Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
 Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
 Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@...aro.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v4] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access

On 3/22/24 4:05 PM, Puranjay Mohan wrote:
[...]
>>> +		/* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */
>>> +		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
>>> +		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
>>> +		     BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) {
>>> +			struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
>>> +			u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit();
>>> +
>>> +			if (!uaddress_limit)
>>> +				goto next_insn;
>>> +
>>> +			*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg);
>>> +			if (insn->off)
>>> +				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off);
>>> +			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
>>> +			*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2);
>>> +			*patch++ = *insn;
>>> +			*patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1);
>>> +			*patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0);
>>
>> But how does this address other cases where we could fault e.g. non-canonical,
>> vsyscall page, etc? Technically, we would have to call to copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed()
>> to really address all the cases aside from the overflow (good catch btw!) where kernel
>> turns into user address.
> 
> So, we are trying to ~simulate a call to
> copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() here. If the address under
> consideration is below TASK_SIZE (TASK_SIZE + 4GB to be precise) then we
> skip that load because that address could be mapped by the user.
> 
> If the address is above TASK_SIZE + 4GB, we allow the load and it could
> cause a fault if the address is invalid, non-canonical etc. Taking the
> fault is fine because JIT will add an exception table entry for
> for that load with BPF_PBOBE_MEM.

Are you sure? I don't think the kernel handles non-canonical fixup.

> The vsyscall page is special, this approach skips all loads from this
> page. I am not sure if that is acceptable.

The bpf_probe_read_kernel() does handle it fine via copy_from_kernel_nofault().

So there is tail risk that BPF_PROBE_* could trigger a crash. Other archs might
have other quirks, e.g. in case of loongarch it says highest bit set means kernel
space.