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Message-ID: <20240324210211.GV538574@ZenIV>
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 21:02:11 +0000
From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@...il.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
CIFS <linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org>,
Paulo Alcantara <pc@...guebit.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kernel crash in mknod
On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 04:50:24PM +0000, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Also, please update the description of security_path_post_mknod() to say
> that it is not going to be called for non-regular files.
If anything, it's rather security_past_create_without_open(), and
I really wonder where does the equivalent of those actions happen
if you do close(open("foo", O_CREAT|O_RDWR, 0777)) instead of
mknod("foo", 0777, 0). I mean, you can substitute the former
for the latter, so anything that must be done by the hook in
mknod(2) would better be covered at some point in hooks within
open(2)... Some explanation of the relationship between those
would be nice.
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