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Message-Id: <20240326021656.202649-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 19:16:42 -0700
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: Liam.Howlett@...cle.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
bp@...en8.de,
broonie@...nel.org,
christophe.leroy@...roup.eu,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
debug@...osinc.com,
hpa@...or.com,
keescook@...omium.org,
kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
luto@...nel.org,
mingo@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org,
tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 00/14] Cover a guard gap corner case
Hi,
For v4, is just some small non-functional changes from Christophe Leroy,
including splitting two patches.
Also, rebase to v6.9-rc1. This included converting two new
mm->get_unmapped_area() callsites that popped up.
v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240312222843.2505560-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240226190951.3240433-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240215231332.1556787-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
=======
In working on x86’s shadow stack feature, I came across some limitations
around the kernel’s handling of guard gaps. AFAICT these limitations are
not too important for the traditional stack usage of guard gaps, but have
bigger impact on shadow stack’s usage. And now in addition to x86, we have
two other architectures implementing shadow stack like features that plan
to use guard gaps. I wanted to see about addressing them, but I have not
worked on mmap() placement related code before, so would greatly
appreciate if people could take a look and point me in the right
direction.
The nature of the limitations of concern is as follows. In order to ensure
guard gaps between mappings, mmap() would need to consider two things:
1. That the new mapping isn’t placed in an any existing mapping’s guard
gap.
2. That the new mapping isn’t placed such that any existing mappings are
not in *its* guard gaps
Currently mmap never considers (2), and (1) is not considered in some
situations.
When not passing an address hint, or passing one without
MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, (1) is enforced. With MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, (1) is not
enforced. With MAP_FIXED, (1) is not considered, but this seems to be
expected since MAP_FIXED can already clobber existing mappings. For
MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE I would have guessed it should respect the guard gaps
of existing mappings, but it is probably a little ambiguous.
In this series I just tried to add enforcement of (2) for the normal (no
address hint) case and only for the newer shadow stack memory (not
stacks). The reason is that with the no-address-hint situation, landing
next to a guard gap could come up naturally and so be more influencable by
attackers such that two shadow stacks could be adjacent without a guard
gap. Where as the address-hint scenarios would require more control -
being able to call mmap() with specific arguments. As for why not just fix
the other corner cases anyway, I thought it might have some greater
possibility of affecting existing apps.
Thanks,
Rick
Rick Edgecombe (14):
proc: Refactor pde_get_unmapped_area as prep
mm: Switch mm->get_unmapped_area() to a flag
mm: Introduce arch_get_unmapped_area_vmflags()
mm: Remove export for get_unmapped_area()
mm: Use get_unmapped_area_vmflags()
thp: Add thp_get_unmapped_area_vmflags()
csky: Use initializer for struct vm_unmapped_area_info
parisc: Use initializer for struct vm_unmapped_area_info
powerpc: Use initializer for struct vm_unmapped_area_info
treewide: Use initializer for struct vm_unmapped_area_info
mm: Take placement mappings gap into account
x86/mm: Implement HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA_VMFLAGS
x86/mm: Care about shadow stack guard gap during placement
selftests/x86: Add placement guard gap test for shstk
arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c | 5 +-
arch/arc/mm/mmap.c | 4 +-
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 5 +-
arch/csky/abiv1/mmap.c | 12 +-
arch/loongarch/mm/mmap.c | 3 +-
arch/mips/mm/mmap.c | 3 +-
arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 6 +-
arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slice.c | 20 ++--
arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 9 +-
arch/s390/mm/mmap.c | 9 +-
arch/sh/mm/mmap.c | 5 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_32.c | 3 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc_64.c | 20 ++--
arch/sparc/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 42 +++++--
arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 9 +-
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 4 +-
drivers/char/mem.c | 2 +-
drivers/dax/device.c | 6 +-
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 11 +-
fs/proc/inode.c | 10 +-
fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/huge_mm.h | 11 ++
include/linux/mm.h | 12 +-
include/linux/mm_types.h | 6 +-
include/linux/sched/coredump.h | 5 +-
include/linux/sched/mm.h | 22 ++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/arena.c | 2 +-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
mm/debug.c | 6 -
mm/huge_memory.c | 26 +++--
mm/mmap.c | 106 +++++++++++++-----
mm/shmem.c | 11 +-
mm/util.c | 6 +-
.../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 67 ++++++++++-
38 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 174 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
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