linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v16 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)

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Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 22:38:29 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>, "Fan Wu"
 <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, <corbet@....net>, <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
 <jmorris@...ei.org>, <serge@...lyn.com>, <tytso@....edu>,
 <ebiggers@...nel.org>, <axboe@...nel.dk>, <agk@...hat.com>,
 <snitzer@...nel.org>, <eparis@...hat.com>, <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <fsverity@...ts.linux.dev>,
 <linux-block@...r.kernel.org>, <dm-devel@...ts.linux.dev>,
 <audit@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)

On Thu Mar 28, 2024 at 10:36 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu Mar 28, 2024 at 10:17 PM EET, Fan Wu wrote:
> > Overview:
> > ---------
>
> s/://
>
> It is already a heading.
>
> >
> > IPE is a Linux Security Module which takes a complimentary approach to
>   
>   Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is a ...
>
> > access control. Whereas existing mandatory access control mechanisms
> > base their decisions on labels and paths, IPE instead determines
> > whether or not an operation should be allowed based on immutable
> > security properties of the system component the operation is being
> > performed on.
>
> What is "a immutable property of the system component", or even,
> what is "a immutable property" and what is "a system component".
>
> These should be defined per context of use as there is no unambiguous
> definitions of these "properties".
>
> So can you add a paragraph before this defining these concepts?
> Otherwise, it would be pretty hard to review any of this.
>
> I.e. I have to make my own imaginary definitions of them and possibly
> make completely false conclusions what was meant.

This might sound like nitpicking but often in security patch sets
people get their own ideas and that leads to useless iterations
etc. so I think it is useful to be pretty formal with definitions
so that we dont end up shadow boxing...

I have ton of experience with this with SGX patches in the past.

BR, Jarkko