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Message-ID: <4a0b28ba-be57-4443-b91e-1a744a0feabf@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 12:53:40 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Steve French <smfrench@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
CIFS <linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org>, Paulo Alcantara <pc@...guebit.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: kernel crash in mknod
On 3/26/2024 12:40 PM, Christian Brauner wrote:
>> we can change the parameter of security_path_post_mknod() from
>> dentry to inode?
>
> If all current callers only operate on the inode then it seems the best
> to only pass the inode. If there's some reason someone later needs a
> dentry the hook can always be changed.
Ok, so the crash is likely caused by:
void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry
*dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
I guess we can also simply check if there is an inode attached to the
dentry, to minimize the changes. I can do both.
More technical question, do I need to do extra checks on the dentry
before calling security_path_post_mknod()?
Thanks
Roberto
> For bigger changes it's also worthwhile if the object that's passed down
> into the hook-based LSM layer is as specific as possible. If someone
> does a change that affects lifetime rules of mounts then any hook that
> takes a struct path argument that's unused means going through each LSM
> that implements the hook only to find out it's not actually used.
> Similar for dentry vs inode imho.
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