linux-kernel - [PATCH v9 11/14] x86/cpu/keylocker: Check Register File Data Sampling mitigation

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Message-Id: <20240329015346.635933-12-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 18:53:43 -0700
From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@...hat.com
Cc: ebiggers@...nel.org,
	luto@...nel.org,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	tglx@...utronix.de,
	bp@...en8.de,
	mingo@...nel.org,
	x86@...nel.org,
	herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
	ardb@...nel.org,
	elliott@....com,
	dan.j.williams@...el.com,
	bernie.keany@...el.com,
	charishma1.gairuboyina@...el.com,
	chang.seok.bae@...el.com,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 11/14] x86/cpu/keylocker: Check Register File Data Sampling mitigation

The Register File Data Sampling vulnerability may allow malicious
userspace programs to infer stale kernel register data, potentially
exposing sensitive key values, including AES keys.

To address this vulnerability, a microcode update needs to be applied to
the CPU, which modifies the VERW instruction to flush the affected CPU
buffers.

The kernel already has a facility to flush CPU buffers before returning
to userspace, which is indicated by the X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF flag.

Ensure the mitigation before enabling Key Locker. Do not enable the
feature on CPUs affected by the vulnerability but lacks mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
Change from v8:
* Add as a new patch.

Note that the code change follows the mitigation guidance [1]:
  "Software loading Key Locker keys using LOADIWKEY should execute a VERW
   to clear registers before transitioning to untrusted code to prevent
   later software from inferring the loaded key."

[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/register-file-data-sampling.html
---
 arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
index d4f3aa65ea8a..6e805c4da76d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/keylocker.c
@@ -135,12 +135,29 @@ static bool __init have_gds_mitigation(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
+/*
+ * IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is retrieved during the setting of
+ * X86_BUG_RFDS. Ensure that the mitigation is applied to flush CPU
+ * buffers by checking the flag.
+ */
+static bool __init have_rfds_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
+		return true;
+
+	pr_warn("x86/keylocker: Susceptible to the RFDS vulnerability.\n");
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Check if Key Locker is secure enough to be used. */
 static bool __init secure_keylocker(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) && !have_gds_mitigation())
 		return false;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) && !have_rfds_mitigation())
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1