linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 24/29] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP

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Message-ID: <00800f4b-5403-4416-b984-12b207362a19@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 22:35:33 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
 linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, jroedel@...e.de,
 thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com, ardb@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com,
 vkuznets@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
 dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com,
 peterz@...radead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com,
 rientjes@...gle.com, dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
 vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
 tony.luck@...el.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
 alpergun@...gle.com, jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com,
 nikunj.dadhania@....com, pankaj.gupta@....com, liam.merwick@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 24/29] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU
 notifications for SNP

On 3/29/24 23:58, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> 
> With SNP/guest_memfd, private/encrypted memory should not be mappable,
> and MMU notifications for HVA-mapped memory will only be relevant to
> unencrypted guest memory. Therefore, the rationale behind issuing a
> wbinvd_on_all_cpus() in sev_guest_memory_reclaimed() should not apply
> for SNP guests and can be ignored.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> [mdr: Add some clarifications in commit]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>

Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 31f6f4786503..3e8de7cb3c89 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2975,7 +2975,14 @@ static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va)
>   
>   void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
>   {
> -	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +	/*
> +	 * With SNP+gmem, private/encrypted memory should be
> +	 * unreachable via the hva-based mmu notifiers. Additionally,
> +	 * for shared->private translations, H/W coherency will ensure
> +	 * first guest access to the page would clear out any existing
> +	 * dirty copies of that cacheline.
> +	 */
> +	if (!sev_guest(kvm) || sev_snp_guest(kvm))
>   		return;
>   
>   	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();