linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv2 1/3] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe

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Message-ID: <20240403135650.GA31764@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 15:56:51 +0200
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@...il.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 1/3] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return
 probe

I leave this to you and Masami, but...

On 04/03, Jiri Olsa wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 10:07:08AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> >
> > This is interesting approach. But I doubt we need to add additional
> > syscall just for this purpose. Can't we use another syscall or ioctl?
>
> so the plan is to optimize entry uprobe in a similar way and given
> the syscall is not a scarce resource I wanted to add another syscall
> for that one as well
>
> tbh I'm not sure sure which syscall or ioctl to reuse for this, it's
> possible to do that, the trampoline will just have to save one or
> more additional registers, but adding new syscall seems cleaner to me

Agreed.

> > Also, we should run syzkaller on this syscall. And if uretprobe is
>
> right, I'll check on syzkaller

I don't understand this concern...

> > set in the user function, what happen if the user function directly
> > calls this syscall? (maybe it consumes shadow stack?)
>
> the process should receive SIGILL if there's no pending uretprobe for
> the current task,

Yes,

> or it will trigger uretprobe if there's one pending

.. and corrupt the caller. So what?

> but we could limit the syscall to be executed just from the trampoline,
> that should prevent all the user space use cases, I'll do that in next
> version and add more tests for that

Yes, we can... well, ignoring the race with mremap() from another thread.

But why should we care?

Userspace should not call sys_uretprobe(). Likewise, it should not call
sys_restart_syscall(). Likewise, it should not jump to xol_area.

Of course, userspace (especially syzkaller) _can_ do this. So what?

I think the only thing we need to ensure is that the "malicious" task
which calls sys_uretprobe() can only harm itself, nothing more.

No?

Oleg.