linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv2 1/3] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe

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Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 10:22:03 +0900
From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>, Jiri Olsa
 <olsajiri@...il.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Alexei
 Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
 Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org, Song Liu
 <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>, John Fastabend
 <john.fastabend@...il.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Thomas
 Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>,
 x86@...nel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 1/3] uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return
 probe

On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 18:11:09 +0200
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:

> On 04/05, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> >
> > Can we make this syscall and uprobe behavior clearer? As you said, if
> > the application use sigreturn or longjump, it may skip returns and
> > shadow stack entries are left in the kernel. In such cases, can uretprobe
> > detect it properly, or just crash the process (or process runs wrongly)?
> 
> Please see the comment in handle_trampoline(), it tries to detect this case.
> This patch should not make any difference.

I think you mean this loop will skip and discard the stacked return_instance
to find the valid one.

----
        do {
                /*
                 * We should throw out the frames invalidated by longjmp().
                 * If this chain is valid, then the next one should be alive
                 * or NULL; the latter case means that nobody but ri->func
                 * could hit this trampoline on return. TODO: sigaltstack().
                 */
                next = find_next_ret_chain(ri);
                valid = !next || arch_uretprobe_is_alive(next, RP_CHECK_RET, regs);

                instruction_pointer_set(regs, ri->orig_ret_vaddr);
                do {
                        if (valid)
                                handle_uretprobe_chain(ri, regs);
                        ri = free_ret_instance(ri);
                        utask->depth--;
                } while (ri != next);
        } while (!valid);
----

I think this expects setjmp/longjmp as below

foo() { <- retprobe1
	setjmp()
	bar() { <- retprobe2
		longjmp()
	}
} <- return to trampoline

In this case, we need to skip retprobe2's instance.
My concern is, if we can not find appropriate return instance, what happen?
e.g.

foo() { <-- retprobe1
   bar() { # sp is decremented
       sys_uretprobe() <-- ??
    }
}

It seems sys_uretprobe() will handle retprobe1 at that point instead of
SIGILL.

Can we avoid this with below strict check?

if (ri->stack != regs->sp + expected_offset)
	goto sigill;

expected_offset should be 16 (push * 3 - ret) on x64 if we ri->stack is the
regs->sp right after call.

Thank you,

-- 
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@...nel.org>