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Message-ID: <ZheSGQp7vOLYZj4g@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 09:32:41 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Subject: [PATCH 2b/7] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to
'x86_arch_cap_msr'
* Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org> wrote:
> There's no need to keep reading MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES over and
> over. It's even read in the BHI sysfs function which is a big no-no.
> Just read it once and cache it.
>
> Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 22 +++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 295463707e68..27d6d64eeec3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
> u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
>
> +static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap;
So the 'ia32' there is a misnomer - which already exists in a number of
other places but now becomes annoyingly commonly used.
So I did the patch below on top to clean this up and rename it to
x86_arch_cap_msr.
Thanks,
Ingo
==================>
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 09:25:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr'
So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places,
which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register.
But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only
code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic
quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_.
This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR:
x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix.
So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with
its role and with the naming of the helper function.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 +++++++++++++--------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index a42d8a6f7149..c342c4aa9c68 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1687,11 +1687,11 @@ static int x2apic_state;
static bool x2apic_hw_locked(void)
{
- u64 ia32_cap;
+ u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;
u64 msr;
- ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE) {
+ x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE) {
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS, msr);
return (msr & LEGACY_XAPIC_DISABLED);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 61614d69d71b..eb9972bf154a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
-static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap;
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_arch_cap_msr;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
}
- ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
* On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
* update is required.
*/
- if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ if ( (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
/*
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
* be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
* is required irrespective of SMT state.
*/
- if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
/*
@@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
* FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
* affected systems.
*/
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
else
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
else
rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
* are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
* by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
/* No microcode */
- if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+ if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
/*
* This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
@@ -1541,14 +1541,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
{
- u64 ia32_cap;
+ u64 x86_arch_cap_msr;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
return;
- ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
}
@@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
- (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
+ (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
}
}
@@ -2810,7 +2810,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA))
return "; BHI: Retpoline";
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop";
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 754d91857d63..605c26c009c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1284,25 +1284,25 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long whi
u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
{
- u64 ia32_cap = 0;
+ u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = 0;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, x86_arch_cap_msr);
- return ia32_cap;
+ return x86_arch_cap_msr;
}
-static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
{
- return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
- ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
- ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+ return (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
}
-static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
{
/* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
return false;
/*
@@ -1310,7 +1310,7 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
* indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a
* vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware:
*/
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
return true;
/* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
@@ -1319,11 +1319,11 @@ static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
@@ -1346,17 +1346,17 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades host
* userspace indirect branch performance.
*/
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
+ if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
(cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
}
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
- !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
@@ -1375,9 +1375,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
* update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
*/
- if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
(cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
- (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+ (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
/*
@@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
* nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
*/
- if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+ if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
}
@@ -1429,15 +1429,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
* which means that AVX will be disabled.
*/
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
- if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap))
+ if (vulnerable_to_rfds(x86_arch_cap_msr))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);
/* When virtualized, eIBRS could be hidden, assume vulnerable */
- if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) &&
+ if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO) &&
!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI) &&
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)))
@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
- if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
+ if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
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