lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 10:01:22 -0400
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
        roberto.sassu@...wei.com, amir73il@...il.com, miklos@...redi.hu,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: [RFC 2/2] ima: Fix detection of read/write violations on stacked filesystems

On a stacked filesystem, when one process opens the file holding a file's
data (e.g., on upper or lower layer on overlayfs) then issue a violation
when another process opens the file for reading on the top layer (overlay
layer on overlayfs). This then provides similar behavior to the existing
case where a violation is generated when one process opens a file for
writing and another one opens the same file for reading. On stacked
filesystem also search all the lower layers for relevant files opened for
writing and issue the violation if one is found.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f04f43af651c..590dd9d5d99a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -121,8 +121,11 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 				     const char **pathname,
 				     char *filename)
 {
+	struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct dentry *fd_dentry, *d;
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+	struct inode *fd_inode;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
 
 	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
@@ -134,11 +137,25 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 						&iint->atomic_flags))
 				send_tomtou = true;
 		}
-	} else {
-		if (must_measure)
-			set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
-			send_writers = true;
+	} else if (must_measure) {
+		set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+		if (inode == real_inode) {
+			if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode))
+				send_writers = true;
+		} else {
+			d = d_real(file_dentry(file), D_REAL_FILEDATA);
+			do {
+				fd_dentry = d;
+				fd_inode = d_inode(fd_dentry);
+				if (inode_is_open_for_write(fd_inode)) {
+					send_writers = true;
+					break;
+				}
+				/* next layer of stacked fs */
+				d = d_real(fd_dentry, D_REAL_FILEDATA);
+			} while (d != fd_dentry);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
-- 
2.43.0


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ