linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/3] x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check

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Message-ID: <ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 11:10:33 -0700
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check

Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
at all.

Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().

Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index dcb97cc2758f..e827613c9e39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1652,7 +1652,8 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
 		return;
 
 	/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
 		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
 		if (rrsba_disabled)
 			return;
@@ -2833,11 +2834,13 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_BHI))
 		return "; BHI: Not affected";
-	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
 		return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
-	else if  (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
 		return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
-	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+		 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) &&
+		 rrsba_disabled)
 		return "; BHI: Retpoline";
 	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
 		return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";
-- 
2.44.0