linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed

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Message-ID: <20240412224232.uiaht6yx2ghtx3gg@desk>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 15:42:32 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 11:10:32AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 3c7434329661..7c87fe80c696 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -470,6 +470,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL		(21*32+ 2) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control available */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW	(21*32+ 3) /* "" BHI_DIS_S HW control enabled */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT (21*32+ 4) /* "" Clear branch history at vmexit using SW loop */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE	(21*32+ 4) /* "" Indirect branches aren't vulnerable to Spectre v2 */

This should be (21*32+ 5).

Other than that:

Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>