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Message-ID: <a876accc-a7bf-4317-9612-d6d5a1fbaf9c@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 15:22:00 +0300
From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
To: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, isaku.yamahata@...il.com,
 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, erdemaktas@...gle.com,
 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Sagi Shahar <sagis@...gle.com>,
 Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, chen.bo@...el.com, hang.yuan@...el.com,
 tina.zhang@...el.com, isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 076/130] KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization

On 12/04/24 04:08, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 07:39:11PM +0300,
> Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 26/02/24 10:26, isaku.yamahata@...el.com wrote:
>>> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
>>>
>>> To protect the initial contents of the guest TD, the TDX module measures
>>> the guest TD during the build process as SHA-384 measurement.  The
>>> measurement of the guest TD contents needs to be completed to make the
>>> guest TD ready to run.
>>>
>>> Add a new subcommand, KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, for VM-scoped
>>> KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to finalize the measurement and mark the TDX VM ready
>>> to run.
>>
>> Perhaps a spruced up commit message would be:
>>
>> <BEGIN>
>> Add a new VM-scoped KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP IOCTL subcommand,
>> KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM, to perform TD Measurement Finalization.
>>
>> Documentation for the API is added in another patch:
>> "Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)"
>>
>> For the purpose of attestation, a measurement must be made of the TDX VM
>> initial state. This is referred to as TD Measurement Finalization, and
>> uses SEAMCALL TDH.MR.FINALIZE, after which:
>> 1. The VMM adding TD private pages with arbitrary content is no longer
>>    allowed
>> 2. The TDX VM is runnable
>> <END>
>>
>> History:
>>
>> This code is essentially unchanged from V1, as below.
>> Except for V5, the code has never had any comments.
>> Paolo's comment from then still appears unaddressed.
>>
>> V19:		Unchanged
>> V18:		Undoes change of V17
>> V17:		Also change tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>> V16:		Unchanged
>> V15:		Undoes change of V10
>> V11-V14:	Unchanged
>> V10:		Adds a hack (related to TDH_MEM_TRACK)
>> 		that was later removed in V15
>> V6-V9:		Unchanged
>> V5		Broke out the code into a separate patch and
>> 		received its only comments, which were from Paolo:
>>
>> 	"Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
>> 	Note however that errors should be passed back in the struct."
>> 		
>> 	This presumably refers to struct kvm_tdx_cmd which has an "error"
>> 	member, but that is not updated by tdx_td_finalizemr()
>>
>> V4 was a cut-down series and the code was not present
>> V3 introduced WARN_ON_ONCE for the error condition
>> V2 accommodated renaming the seamcall function and ID
> 
> Thank you for creating histories. Let me update the commit message.
> 
> 
>> Outstanding:
>>
>> 1. Address Paolo's comment about the error code
>> 2. Is WARN_ON sensible?
> 
> See below.
> 
> 
>> Final note:
>>
>> It might be possible to make TD Measurement Finalization
>> transparent to the user space VMM and forego another API, but it seems
>> doubtful that would really make anything much simpler.
>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
>>>
>>> ---
>>> v18:
>>> - Remove the change of tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h.
>>>
>>> v14 -> v15:
>>> - removed unconditional tdx_track() by tdx_flush_tlb_current() that
>>>   does tdx_track().
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  1 +
>>>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>>> index 34167404020c..c160f60189d1 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>>> @@ -573,6 +573,7 @@ enum kvm_tdx_cmd_id {
>>>  	KVM_TDX_INIT_VM,
>>>  	KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU,
>>>  	KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY,
>>> +	KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM,
>>>  
>>>  	KVM_TDX_CMD_NR_MAX,
>>>  };
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> index 3cfba63a7762..6aff3f7e2488 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> @@ -1400,6 +1400,24 @@ static int tdx_extend_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
>>>  	return ret;
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +static int tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm *kvm)
>>> +{
>>> +	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
>>> +	u64 err;
>>> +
>>> +	if (!is_hkid_assigned(kvm_tdx) || is_td_finalized(kvm_tdx))
>>> +		return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> +	err = tdh_mr_finalize(kvm_tdx->tdr_pa);
>>> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) {
>>
>> Is a failed SEAMCALL really something to WARN over?
> 
> Because user can trigger an error in some cases, we shouldn't WARN in such case.
> Except those, TDH.MR.FINALIZE() shouldn't return error.  If we hit such error,
> it typically implies serious error so that the recovery is difficult.  For
> example, the TDX module was broken by the host overwriting private pages.
> That's the reason why we have KVM_BUN_ON.  So the error check should be
> something like
>  
> 
>         /* We can hit busy error to exclusively access TDR. */
>  	if (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX))
> 		return -EAGAIN;
>         /* User can call KVM_TDX_INIT_VM without any vCPUs created. */
> 	if (err == TDX_NO_VCPUS)
> 		return -EIO;
>         /* Other error shouldn't happen. */
>         if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
>                 pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, err);
>                 return -EIO;
>         }
> 
> 
>>> +		pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, err, NULL);
>>
>> As per Paolo, error code is not returned in struct kvm_tdx_cmd
> 
> 
> It will be something like the followings. No compile test yet.
> 
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index 0d3b79b5c42a..c7ff819ccaf1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -2757,6 +2757,12 @@ static int tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm *kvm)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	err = tdh_mr_finalize(kvm_tdx);
> +	kvm_tdx->hw_error = err;
> +
> +	if (err == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX))

There seem to be also implicit operand codes.  How sure are
we that TDX_OPERAND_ID_RCX is the only valid busy operand?

> +		return -EAGAIN;
> +	if (err == TDX_NO_VCPUS)

TDX_NO_VCPUS is not one of the completion status codes for
TDH.MR.FINALIZE

> +		return -EIO;
>  	if (KVM_BUG_ON(err, kvm)) {
>  		pr_tdx_error(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, err);
>  		return -EIO;
> @@ -2768,6 +2774,7 @@ static int tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm *kvm)
>  
>  int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  {
> +	struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
>  	struct kvm_tdx_cmd tdx_cmd;
>  	int r;
>  
> @@ -2777,6 +2784,7 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> +	kvm_tdx->hw_error = 0;
>  
>  	switch (tdx_cmd.id) {
>  	case KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES:
> @@ -2793,6 +2801,7 @@ int tdx_vm_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  
> +	tdx_cmd.error = kvm_tdx->hw_error;
>  	if (copy_to_user(argp, &tdx_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx_cmd)))
>  		r = -EFAULT;
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> index 98f5d7c5891a..dc150b8bdd5f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ struct kvm_tdx {
>  	u64 xfam;
>  	int hkid;
>  
> +	/* For KVM_TDX ioctl to return SEAMCALL status code. */
> +	u64 hw_error;

For this case, it seems weird to have a struct member
to pass back a return status code,  why not make it a parameter
of tdx_td_finalizemr() or pass &tdx_cmd?

> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Used on each TD-exit, see tdx_user_return_update_cache().
>  	 * TSX_CTRL value on TD exit
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> index a8aa8b79e9a1..6c701856c9a8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
>  #define TDX_TD_FATAL				0xC000060400000000ULL
>  #define TDX_TD_NON_DEBUG			0xC000060500000000ULL
>  #define TDX_LIFECYCLE_STATE_INCORRECT		0xC000060700000000ULL
> +#define TDX_NO_VCPUS				0xC000060900000000ULL
>  #define TDX_TDCX_NUM_INCORRECT			0xC000061000000000ULL
>  #define TDX_VCPU_STATE_INCORRECT		0xC000070000000000ULL
>  #define TDX_VCPU_ASSOCIATED			0x8000070100000000ULL


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