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Message-ID: <171308637277.10875.5583955178829069240.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2024 09:19:32 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 69129794d94c544810e68b2b4eaa7e44063f9bf2
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/69129794d94c544810e68b2b4eaa7e44063f9bf2
Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
AuthorDate: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 11:10:33 -07:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Sun, 14 Apr 2024 11:10:05 +02:00
x86/bugs: Fix BHI retpoline check
Confusingly, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE doesn't mean retpolines are enabled,
as it also includes the original "AMD retpoline" which isn't a retpoline
at all.
Also replace cpu_feature_enabled() with boot_cpu_has() because this is
before alternatives are patched and cpu_feature_enabled()'s fallback
path is slower than plain old boot_cpu_has().
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ad3807424a3953f0323c011a643405619f2a4927.1712944776.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ca295b0..ab18185 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1652,7 +1652,8 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) {
spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
if (rrsba_disabled)
return;
@@ -2804,11 +2805,13 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_BHI))
return "; BHI: Not affected";
- else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW))
return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S";
- else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP))
return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop";
- else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled)
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) &&
+ rrsba_disabled)
return "; BHI: Retpoline";
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT))
return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop";
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