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Message-ID: <2af16cb4-32ed-4b91-872b-f0cc9ed92e59@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 17:14:05 +0200
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc: alexandre.chartre@...cle.com, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
konrad.wilk@...cle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, seanjc@...gle.com,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, nik.borisov@...e.com, kpsingh@...nel.org,
longman@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected
by BHI
On 4/11/24 15:20, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>
> On 4/11/24 13:14, Chao Gao wrote:
>>>> The problem is that we can end up with a guest running extra BHI
>>>> mitigations
>>>> while this is not needed. Could we inform the guest that eIBRS is not
>>>> available
>>>> on the system so a Linux guest doesn't run with extra BHI mitigations?
>>>
>>> Well, that's why Intel specified some MSRs at 0x5000xxxx.
>>
>> Yes. But note that there is a subtle difference. Those MSRs are used for guest
>> to communicate in-used software mitigations to the host. Such information is
>> stable across migration. Here we need the host to communicate that eIBRS isn't
>> available to the guest. this isn't stable as the guest may be migrated from
>> a host without eIBRS to one with it.
>>
>>>
>>> Except I don't know anyone currently interested in implementing them,
>>> and I'm still not sure if they work correctly for some of the more
>>> complicated migration cases.
>>
>> Looks you have the same opinion on the Intel-defined virtual MSRs as Sean.
>> If we all agree the issue here and the effectivenss problem of the short
>> BHB-clearing sequence need to be resolved and don't think the Intel-defined
>> virtual MSRs can handle all cases correctly, we have to define a better
>> interface through community collaboration as Sean suggested.
>
> Another solution could be to add cpus to cpu_vuln_whitelist with BHI_NO.
> (e.g. explicitly add cpus which have eIBRS). That way, the kernel will
> figure out the right mitigation on the host and guest.
>
More precisely we could something like this (this is just an example, obviously
the list is clearly incomplete):
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 754d91857d63..80477170ccc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1182,6 +1182,24 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ /*
+ * The following Intel CPUs are affected by BHI, but they don't have
+ * the eIBRS feature. In that case, the default Spectre v2 mitigations
+ * are enough to also mitigate BHI. We mark these CPUs with NO_BHI so
+ * that X86_BUG_BHI doesn't get set and no extra BHI mitigation is
+ * enabled.
+ *
+ * This avoids guest VMs from enabling extra BHI mitigation when this
+ * is not needed. For guest, X86_BUG_BHI is never set for CPUs which
+ * don't have the eIBRS feature. But this doesn't happen in guest VMs
+ * as the virtualization can hide the eIBRS feature.
+ */
+ VULNWL_INTEL(IVYBRIDGE_X, NO_BHI),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(HASWELL_X, NO_BHI),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(BROADWELL_X, NO_BHI),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(SKYLAKE_X, NO_BHI),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(SKYLAKE_X, NO_BHI),
+
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BH
alex.
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