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Message-ID: <20240415-anspielen-gelyncht-d2f0efd6569e@brauner>
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 16:28:28 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Ilya Denisyev <dev@...cl.ru>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@...wei.com>,
Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be>, Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@...rosoft.com>, KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@...jp.nec.com>,
linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, lvc-project@...uxtesting.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] jffs2: prevent xattr node from overflowing the eraseblock
On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 06:53:54PM +0300, Ilya Denisyev wrote:
> Add a check to make sure that the requested xattr node size is no larger
> than the eraseblock minus the cleanmarker.
>
> Unlike the usual inode nodes, the xattr nodes aren't split into parts
> and spread across multiple eraseblocks, which means that a xattr node
> must not occupy more than one eraseblock. If the requested xattr value is
> too large, the xattr node can spill onto the next eraseblock, overwriting
> the nodes and causing errors such as:
>
> jffs2: argh. node added in wrong place at 0x0000b050(2)
> jffs2: nextblock 0x0000a000, expected at 0000b00c
> jffs2: error: (823) do_verify_xattr_datum: node CRC failed at 0x01e050,
> read=0xfc892c93, calc=0x000000
> jffs2: notice: (823) jffs2_get_inode_nodes: Node header CRC failed
> at 0x01e00c. {848f,2fc4,0fef511f,59a3d171}
> jffs2: Node at 0x0000000c with length 0x00001044 would run over the
> end of the erase block
> jffs2: Perhaps the file system was created with the wrong erase size?
> jffs2: jffs2_scan_eraseblock(): Magic bitmask 0x1985 not found
> at 0x00000010: 0x1044 instead
>
> This breaks the filesystem and can lead to KASAN crashes such as:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
> Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802c31e914 by task repro/830
> CPU: 0 PID: 830 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
> BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0x120
> print_report+0xc4/0x620
> ? __virt_addr_valid+0x308/0x5b0
> kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
> ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
> ? jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
> jffs2_sum_add_kvec+0x125e/0x15d0
> jffs2_flash_direct_writev+0xa8/0xd0
> jffs2_flash_writev+0x9c9/0xef0
> ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0xc4/0x160
> ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x140
> ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> [...]
>
> Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
>
> Fixes: aa98d7cf59b5 ("[JFFS2][XATTR] XATTR support on JFFS2 (version. 5)")
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Denisyev <dev@...cl.ru>
> ---
> fs/jffs2/xattr.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/jffs2/xattr.c b/fs/jffs2/xattr.c
> index 00224f3a8d6e..9509b33f7675 100644
> --- a/fs/jffs2/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/jffs2/xattr.c
> @@ -1110,6 +1110,9 @@ int do_jffs2_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int xprefix, const char *xname,
> return rc;
>
> request = PAD(sizeof(struct jffs2_raw_xattr) + strlen(xname) + 1 + size);
> + if (request > c->sector_size - c->cleanmarker_size)
Can this overflow? I.e. can c->sector_size be smaller than c->cleanmarker_size?
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