linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v19 058/130] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu

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Message-ID: <ZiXautOkEweWfUL0@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:34:18 +0800
From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
To: <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
CC: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<isaku.yamahata@...il.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	<erdemaktas@...gle.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Sagi Shahar
	<sagis@...gle.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, <chen.bo@...el.com>,
	<hang.yuan@...el.com>, <tina.zhang@...el.com>, Binbin Wu
	<binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 058/130] KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to
 struct kvm_mmu_page

On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 12:26:00AM -0800, isaku.yamahata@...el.com wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
> +static inline void *kvm_mmu_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> +{
> +	return sp->private_spt;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void kvm_mmu_init_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, void *private_spt)
> +{
> +	sp->private_spt = private_spt;
> +}
This function is actually not used for initialization.
Instead, it's only called after failure of free_private_spt() in order to
intentionally leak the page to prevent kernel from accessing the encrypted page.

So to avoid confusion, how about renaming it to kvm_mmu_leak_private_spt() and
always resetting the pointer to NULL?

static inline void kvm_mmu_leak_private_spt(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
	sp->private_spt = NULL;
}

> +
> +static inline void kvm_mmu_alloc_private_spt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
> +{
> +	bool is_root = vcpu->arch.root_mmu.root_role.level == sp->role.level;
> +
> +	KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_mmu_page_role_is_private(sp->role), vcpu->kvm);
> +	if (is_root)
> +		/*
> +		 * Because TDX module assigns root Secure-EPT page and set it to
> +		 * Secure-EPTP when TD vcpu is created, secure page table for
> +		 * root isn't needed.
> +		 */
> +		sp->private_spt = NULL;
> +	else {
> +		/*
> +		 * Because the TDX module doesn't trust VMM and initializes
> +		 * the pages itself, KVM doesn't initialize them.  Allocate
> +		 * pages with garbage and give them to the TDX module.
> +		 */
> +		sp->private_spt = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_alloc(&vcpu->arch.mmu_private_spt_cache);
> +		/*
> +		 * Because mmu_private_spt_cache is topped up before starting
> +		 * kvm page fault resolving, the allocation above shouldn't
> +		 * fail.
> +		 */
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->private_spt);
> +	}
> +}