[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <3a6eccbd-263d-4a54-a35f-c16f60dc0a11@yandex.ru>
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 01:52:45 +0300
From: stsp <stsp2@...dex.ru>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Stefan Metzmacher <metze@...ba.org>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>,
Alexander Aring <alex.aring@...il.com>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] implement OA2_INHERIT_CRED flag for openat2()
23.04.2024 19:44, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
> Also, there are lots of ways that f_cred could be relevant: fsuid/fsgid, effective capabilities and security labels. And it gets more complex if this ever gets extended to support connecting or sending to a socket or if someone opens a device node. Does CAP_SYS_ADMIN carry over?
I posted a v3 where I only override
fsuid, fsgid and group_info.
Capabilities and whatever else are
not overridden to avoid security risks.
Does this address your concern?
Note that I think your other concerns
are already addressed, I just added a
bit more of a description now.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists