Message-ID: <2b28414a7c7e4c53057ef8e527f85c05eb225d85.camel@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:34:24 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, 
 linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 zohar@...ux.ibm.com,  roberto.sassu@...wei.com, miklos@...redi.hu,
 brauner@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] ima: Fix detection of read/write violations
 on stacked filesystems

On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 15:37 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 25, 2024 at 2:30 PM Roberto Sassu
> > <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com> wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > On Tue, 2024-04-23 at 09:02 +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 6:07 PM Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > This series fixes the detection of read/write violations on stacked
> > > > > > > > filesystems. To be able to access the relevant dentries necessary to
> > > > > > > > detect files opened for writing on a stacked filesystem a new d_real_type
> > > > > > > > D_REAL_FILEDATA is introduced that allows callers to access all relevant
> > > > > > > > files involved in a stacked filesystem while traversing the layers.
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Stefan,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Both Miklos and myself objected to this solution:
> > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAJfpeguctirEYECoigcAsJwpGPCX2NyfMZ8H8GHGW-0UyKfjgg@mail.gmail.com/
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Not sure what you are hoping to achieve from re-posting the same solution.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I stopped counting how many times I already argued that *all* IMA/EVM
> > > > > > assertions,
> > > > > > including rw-ro violations should be enforced only on the real inode.
> > > > > > I know this does not work - so you should find out why it does not work and fix
> > > > > > the problem.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Enforcing IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer is just the wrong way IMO.
> > > > > > Not once have I heard an argument from IMA/EVM developers why it is really
> > > > > > needed to enforce IMA/EVM on the overlayfs inode layer and not on the
> > > > > > real inode.
> > > > 
> > > > Ok, I try to provide an example regarding this, and we see if it makes
> > > > sense.
> > > > 
> > > > # echo test > test-file
> > > > # chown 2000 d/test-file
> > > > # ls -l a/test-file
> > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file
> > > > 
> > > > Initially there is a file in the lower layer with UID 2000.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > # mount -t overlay -olowerdir=a,upperdir=b,workdir=c,metacopy=on overlay d
> > > > # chown 3000 d/test-file
> > > > # ls -l d/test-file
> > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 d/test-file
> > > > # ls -l a/test-file
> > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 2000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 a/test-file
> > > > # ls -l b/test-file
> > > > -rw-r--r--. 1 3000 root 25 Apr 25 10:50 b/test-file
> > > > 
> > > > If I have a policy like this:
> > > > 
> > > > # echo "measure fsname=overlay fowner=3000" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> > > > 
> > > > there won't be any match on the real file which still has UID 2000. But
> > > > what is observable by the processes through overlayfs is UID 3000.
> > > > 
> > 
> > ok, it is simple to write an ima policy that is not respected by overlayfs.
> > 
> > My question is: under what circumstances is a policy like the above
> > useful in the real world?
> > 
> > Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK, the purpose of IMA/EVM is to
> > mitigate attack vectors of tampering with files offline or after the
> > file's data/metadata were measured. Is that a correct description?

(For now I would talk about IMA, EVM can be considered separately).

The main purpose of IMA is to evaluate files being accessed, and record
the access together with a file digest in a measurement list,
allow/deny access to the file (appraisal), or add a new event to audit
logs.

How files are selected depends on the IMA policy. A rule can be
subject-based or object-based, depending on whether respectively
process or file attributes are matched. It can also be both.

A subject-based rule means that you identify a process/set of
processes, and you evaluate everything it/they read.

An object-based rule means that you identify a file/set of files, and
you evaluate any process accessing them.

Since processes normally would access the top most layer (overlayfs),
the IMA policy should be written in terms of metadata seen in that
layer (but not necessarily).

This is just for identifying the set of files to
measure/appraise/audit, not which file is going to be evaluated, which
will be always the persistent one.

I have to admit, things are not very clear also to me.

Suppose you have a file in the lower filesystem with SELinux label
user_t, and then on overlayfs with metadata copy, you change the label
of this file to unconfined_t.

What will happen exactly? On the overlayfs layer, you will have a
permission request with the new label unconfined_t, but when overlayfs
calls vfs_open(), there will be another permission request with the old
label.

It is kind of the same challenge we are facing with IMA, we can observe
the file operations at different layers. That is why I think having
stacked IMA calls is a good idea (other than really fixing the
violations).

The current problem, that is very difficult to solve, is that the
policy should cover all layers, or some events will be missed. Now we
have overlayfs-specific code to detect changes in the backing inode,
while with stacked IMA calls, we can detect the change at the layer
where it happened (and we can remove the overlayfs-specific code).

Ideally, what I would do to cover all layers is that if there is a
match at one layer, the lower layers should automatically match too,
but it is not that easy since after the vfs_open() recursive calls we
start calling IMA in the botton most layer first.

(What I did with the stacked IMA calls is just an experiment to see how
far we can go, but still we didn't make any decision with Mimi).

> > AFAIK, IMA/EVM policy is system-wide and not namespace aware
> > so the policy has to be set on the container's host and not inside
> > containers. Is that correct?

I know that overlayfs is primarily aiming at containers, but I would
suggest to not add that complexity yet and just consider the host.

> > If those statements are true then please try to explain to me what is
> > the thread model for tampering with overlayfs files, without tampering
> > with the real upper and/or lower files.

I hope at this point is clear that what we care about is that, or the
process is reading the content of the file whose digest is recorded in
the measurement list, or we must signal to remote verifiers concurrent
accesses that make the statement above false.

> > My thesis is that if an IMA/EVM policy is good enough to prevent
> > tampering with the real lower/upper files, then no extra measures
> > are needed to protect the virtual overlayfs files against tampering.

What you say is correct, but the way you identify files to
measure/appraise/audit can be different.

Thanks

Roberto

> > Is my thesis flawed?
> > I'm pretty sure that it is, but I never got a satisfying answer why.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Amir.

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