linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v19 023/130] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module

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Message-ID: <b2bfc0d157929b098dde09b32c9a3af18835ec57.camel@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 11:41:19 +0000
From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
To: "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC: "Zhang, Tina" <tina.zhang@...el.com>, "Yuan, Hang" <hang.yuan@...el.com>,
	"Chen, Bo2" <chen.bo@...el.com>, "sagis@...gle.com" <sagis@...gle.com>,
	"isaku.yamahata@...il.com" <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "Aktas, Erdem"
	<erdemaktas@...gle.com>, "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, "Yamahata, Isaku"
	<isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, "isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com"
	<isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 023/130] KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when
 loading the KVM intel kernel module

On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 15:43 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > On Thu, 2024-04-25 at 09:30 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 23, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > And anecdotally, I know of at least one crash in our production environment where
> > > a VMX instruction hit a seemingly spurious #UD, i.e. it's not impossible for a
> > > ucode bug or hardware defect to cause problems.  That's obviously _extremely_
> > > unlikely, but that's why I emphasized that sanity checking CR4.VMXE is cheap.
> > 
> > Yeah I agree it could happen although very unlikely.
> > 
> > But just to be sure:
> > 
> > I believe the #UD itself doesn't crash the kernel/machine, but should be
> > the kernel unable to handle #UD in such case?
> 
> Correct, the #UD is likely not (immediately) fatal.
> > 
> > If so, I am not sure whether the CR4.VMX check can make the kernel any
> > safer, because we can already handle the #UD for the SEAMCALL instruction.
> 
> It's not about making the kernel safer, it's about helping triage/debug issues.
> 
> > Yeah we can clearly dump message saying "CPU isn't in VMX operation" and
> > return failure if we have the check, but if we don't, the worst situation
> > is we might mistakenly report "CPU isn't in VMX operation" (currently code
> > just treats #UD as CPU not in VMX operation) when CPU doesn't
> > IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3[5].
> > 
> > And for the IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3[5] we can easily do some pre-check in
> > KVM code during module loading to rule out this case.
> > 
> > And in practice, I even believe the BIOS cannot turn on TDX if the
> > IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3[5] is not supported.  I can check on this.
> 
> Eh, I wouldn't worry about that too much.  The only reason I brought up that
> check was to call out that we can't *know* with 100% certainty that SEAMCALL
> failed due to the CPU not being post-VMXON.

OK (though I think we can rule out other cases by adding more checks etc).

> 
> > > Practically speaking it costs nothing, so IMO it's worth adding even if the odds
> > > of it ever being helpful are one-in-and-million.
> > 
> > I think we will need to do below at somewhere for the common SEAMCALL
> > function:
> > 
> > 	unsigned long flags;
> > 	int ret = -EINVAL;
> > 
> > 	local_irq_save(flags);
> > 
> > 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(__read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE)))
> > 		goto out;
> > 
> > 	ret = seamcall();
> > out:
> > 	local_irq_restore(flags);
> > 	return ret;
> > 
> > to make it IRQ safe.
> > 
> > And the odd is currently the common SEAMCALL functions, a.k.a,
> > __seamcall() and seamcall() (the latter is a mocro actually), both return
> > u64, so if we want to have such CR4.VMX check code in the common code, we
> > need to invent a new error code for it.
> 
> Oh, I wasn't thinking that we'd check CR4.VMXE before *every* SEAMCALL, just
> before the TDH.SYS.LP.INIT call, i.e. before the one that is most likely to fail
> due to a software bug that results in the CPU not doing VMXON before enabling
> TDX.
> 
> Again, my intent is to add a simple, cheap, and targeted sanity check to help
> deal with potential failures in code that historically has been less than rock
> solid, and in function that has a big fat assumption that the caller has done
> VMXON on the CPU.

I see.

(To be fair, personally I don't recall that we ever had any bug due to
"cpu not in post-VMXON before SEAMCALL", but maybe it's just me. :-).)

But if tdx_enable() doesn't call tdx_cpu_enable() internally, then we will
have two functions need to handle.

For tdx_enable(), given it's still good idea to disable CPU hotplug around
it, we can still do some check for all online cpus at the beginning, like:

	on_each_cpu(check_cr4_vmx(), &err, 1);

Btw, please also see my last reply to Chao why I don't like calling
tdx_cpu_enable() inside tdx_enable():

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1fd17c931d5c2effcf1105b63deac8e3fb1664bc.camel@intel.com/

That being said, I can try to add additional patch(es) to do CR4.VMX check
if you want, but personally I found hard to have a strong justification to
do so.