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Message-ID: <CAF+opq1LksoebDGY6BGtVoD1FS6ujuJaEJMY0AOP1c3C6KJy0g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 6 May 2024 16:55:17 -0700
From: Vishnu Dasa <vishnu.dasa@...adcom.com>
To: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem@...zon.com>
Cc: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@...zon.de>, Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@...zon.de>,
Bryan Tan <bryan-bt.tan@...adcom.com>,
Broadcom internal kernel review list <bcm-kernel-feedback-list@...adcom.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@...are.com>,
George Zhang <georgezhang@...are.com>, Andy king <acking@...are.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] vmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()
On Tue, Apr 30, 2024 at 2:02 AM Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem@...zon.com> wrote:
>
> From: Hagar Gamal Halim Hemdan <hagarhem@...zon.com>
>
> Coverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,
> event_msg->event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used
> as an index without sanitization.
>
> This change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any
> possibility of speculative information leaks.
>
> This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
> Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.
>
> Only compile tested, no access to HW.
>
> Fixes: 1d990201f9bb ("VMCI: event handling implementation.")
> Signed-off-by: Hagar Gamal Halim Hemdan <hagarhem@...zon.com>
Acked-by: Vishnu Dasa <vishnu.dasa@...adcom.com>
> ---
> v4: Added the testing state in the commit message and rebased on top of
> latest mainline
> ---
> drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_event.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_event.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_event.c
> index 5d7ac07623c2..9a41ab65378d 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_event.c
> +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_event.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <linux/vmw_vmci_api.h>
> #include <linux/list.h>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/rculist.h>
> @@ -86,9 +87,12 @@ static void event_deliver(struct vmci_event_msg *event_msg)
> {
> struct vmci_subscription *cur;
> struct list_head *subscriber_list;
> + u32 sanitized_event, max_vmci_event;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - subscriber_list = &subscriber_array[event_msg->event_data.event];
> + max_vmci_event = ARRAY_SIZE(subscriber_array);
> + sanitized_event = array_index_nospec(event_msg->event_data.event, max_vmci_event);
> + subscriber_list = &subscriber_array[sanitized_event];
> list_for_each_entry_rcu(cur, subscriber_list, node) {
> cur->callback(cur->id, &event_msg->event_data,
> cur->callback_data);
> --
> 2.40.1
>
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