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Message-ID: <Zjo46HkBg2eKYMc7@google.com>
Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 07:21:28 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"mlevitsk@...hat.com" <mlevitsk@...hat.com>, "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 24/27] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and
advertise to userspace
On Mon, May 06, 2024, Rick P Edgecombe wrote:
> I don't immediately see what trouble will be in giving kernel IBT a disable
> parameter that doesn't touch X86_FEATURE_IBT at some point in the future.
Keeping X86_FEATURE_IBT set will result in "ibt" being reported in /proc/cpuinfo,
i.e. will mislead userspace into thinking IBT is supported and fully enabled by
the kernel. For a security feature, that's a pretty big issue.
To fudge around that, we could add a synthetic feature flag to let the kernel
tell KVM whether or not it's safe to virtualize IBT, but I don't see what value
that adds over KVM checking raw host CPUID.
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