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Message-ID: <22dc9ceb-4b16-be68-ed8e-c6a222619032@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 14:13:17 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
 svsm-devel@...onut-svsm.dev, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
 Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
 "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
 Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Michael Roth
 <michael.roth@....com>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/15] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas

On 5/8/24 03:05, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:58:01AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> +static int __svsm_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
> 
> All those protocol functions need a verb in the name:
> 
> __svsm_do_msr_protocol
> __svsm_do_ghcb_protocol
> 
> or something slicker than the silly "do".

ok, maybe __perform_svsm_msr_protocol or such.

> 
>> +{
>> +	u64 val, resp;
>> +	u8 pending;
>> +
>> +	val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
>> +
>> +	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_VMPL_REQ_LEVEL(0));
>> +
>> +	pending = 0;
> 
> Do that assignment above, at declaration.

Ok

> 
>> +	issue_svsm_call(call, &pending);
>> +
>> +	resp = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
>> +
>> +	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(val);
> 
> The MSR SVSM protocol is supposed to restore the MSR? A comment pls.

Ok, I'll put it above the read where val is assigned.

> 
>> +
>> +	if (pending)
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(resp) != GHCB_MSR_VMPL_RESP)
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	if (GHCB_MSR_VMPL_RESP_VAL(resp) != 0)
> 
> s/ != 0//

Ok

> 
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	return call->rax_out;
> 
> rax_out is u64, your function returns int because of the negative
> values. But then it'll truncate the u64 in the success case.

I'll fix that and return 0 here and check the rax_out value on the return.

> 
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int __svsm_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
>> +{
>> +	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
>> +	u8 pending;
>> +
>> +	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
>> +
>> +	/* Fill in protocol and format specifiers */
>> +	ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
>> +	ghcb->ghcb_usage       = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
>> +
>> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
>> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
>> +	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
>> +
>> +	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
>> +
>> +	pending = 0;
> 
> As above.

Yep

> 
>> +	issue_svsm_call(call, &pending);
>> +
>> +	if (pending)
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +	switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
>> +	case ES_OK:
>> +		break;
>> +	case ES_EXCEPTION:
>> +		vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
>> +		fallthrough;
>> +	default:
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return call->rax_out;
> 
> As above.

Ditto.

> 
>> +}
>> +
>>   static enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
>>   					  struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
>>   					  u64 exit_code, u64 exit_info_1,
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> index a500df807e79..21f3cc40d662 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> @@ -133,8 +133,13 @@ struct ghcb_state {
>>   	struct ghcb *ghcb;
>>   };
>>   
>> +/* For early boot SVSM communication */
>> +static struct svsm_ca boot_svsm_ca_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>>   static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
>>   static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, sev_vmsa);
>> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svsm_ca *, svsm_caa);
>> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, svsm_caa_pa);
>>   
>>   struct sev_config {
>>   	__u64 debug		: 1,
>> @@ -150,6 +155,15 @@ struct sev_config {
>>   	       */
>>   	      ghcbs_initialized	: 1,
>>   
>> +	      /*
>> +	       * A flag used to indicate when the per-CPU SVSM CA is to be
> 
> s/A flag used //
> 
> and above.

Sure

> 
>> +	       * used instead of the boot SVSM CA.
>> +	       *
>> +	       * For APs, the per-CPU SVSM CA is created as part of the AP
>> +	       * bringup, so this flag can be used globally for the BSP and APs.
>> +	       */
>> +	      cas_initialized	: 1,
>> +
>>   	      __reserved	: 62;
>>   };
>>   
>> @@ -572,9 +586,42 @@ static enum es_result vc_ioio_check(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u16 port, size_t si
>>   	return ES_EXCEPTION;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static __always_inline void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>> +{
>> +	long error_code = ctxt->fi.error_code;
>> +	int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector;
>> +
>> +	ctxt->regs->orig_ax = ctxt->fi.error_code;
>> +
>> +	switch (trapnr) {
>> +	case X86_TRAP_GP:
>> +		exc_general_protection(ctxt->regs, error_code);
>> +		break;
>> +	case X86_TRAP_UD:
>> +		exc_invalid_op(ctxt->regs);
>> +		break;
>> +	case X86_TRAP_PF:
>> +		write_cr2(ctxt->fi.cr2);
>> +		exc_page_fault(ctxt->regs, error_code);
>> +		break;
>> +	case X86_TRAP_AC:
>> +		exc_alignment_check(ctxt->regs, error_code);
>> +		break;
>> +	default:
>> +		pr_emerg("Unsupported exception in #VC instruction emulation - can't continue\n");
>> +		BUG();
>> +	}
>> +}
>> +
>>   /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
>>   #include "sev-shared.c"
>>   
>> +static struct svsm_ca *__svsm_get_caa(void)
> 
> Why the "__" prefix?
> 
> I gon't see a svsm_get_caa() variant...

There probably was at one point and I missed removing the "__" prefix. 
I'll take care of that.

> 
>> +{
>> +	return sev_cfg.cas_initialized ? this_cpu_read(svsm_caa)
>> +				       : boot_svsm_caa;
>> +}
>> +
>>   static noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
>>   {
>>   	struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
>> @@ -600,6 +647,42 @@ static noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
>>   	}
>>   }
>>   
>> +static int svsm_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
> 
> svsm_issue_protocol_call() or whatnot...
> 
> Btw, can all this svsm guest gunk live simply in a separate file? Or is
> it going to need a lot of sev.c stuff exported through an internal.h
> header?
> 
> Either that or prefix all SVSM handling functions with "svsm_" so that
> there's at least some visibility which is which.

There's quite a bit of interaction so I'll make sure to prefix everything.

> 
>> +{
>> +	struct ghcb_state state;
>> +	unsigned long flags;
>> +	struct ghcb *ghcb;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
>> +	 * order to avoid paravirt issues.
>> +	 */
>> +	flags = native_save_fl();
>> +	if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
>> +		native_irq_disable();
> 
> Uff, conditional locking.
> 
> What's wrong with using local_irq_save/local_irq_restore?

The paravirt versions of local_irq_save and local_irq_restore can't be 
used as early as this routine is called.

> 
>> +
>> +	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
>> +		ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
>> +	else if (boot_ghcb)
>> +		ghcb = boot_ghcb;
>> +	else
>> +		ghcb = NULL;
>> +
>> +	do {
>> +		ret = ghcb ? __svsm_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
>> +			   : __svsm_msr_protocol(call);
>> +	} while (ret == SVSM_ERR_BUSY);
>> +
>> +	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
>> +		__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
>> +
>> +	if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
>> +		native_irq_enable();
>> +
>> +	return ret;
>> +}
> 
> ...
> 
>> @@ -2095,6 +2188,50 @@ static __head struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   	return cc_info;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static __head void setup_svsm(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
> 
> svsm_setup

Yep

> 
>> +{
>> +	struct svsm_call call = {};
>> +	int ret;
>> +	u64 pa;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Record the SVSM Calling Area address (CAA) if the guest is not
>> +	 * running at VMPL0. The CA will be used to communicate with the
>> +	 * SVSM to perform the SVSM services.
>> +	 */
>> +	setup_svsm_ca(cc_info);
>> +
>> +	/* Nothing to do if not running under an SVSM. */
>> +	if (!vmpl)
>> +		return;
> 
> You set up stuff above and now you bail out?

setup_svsm_ca() is what sets the vmpl variable. So nothing will have 
been setup if the VMPL is zero, in which case we don't continue on.

> 
> Judging by setup_svsm_ca() you don't really need that vmpl var but you
> can check
> 
> 	if (!boot_svsm_caa)
> 		return;
> 
> to determine whether a SVSM was detected.

Yes, but the vmpl var will be used for attestation requests, sysfs, etc.

> 
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * It is very early in the boot and the kernel is running identity
>> +	 * mapped but without having adjusted the pagetables to where the
>> +	 * kernel was loaded (physbase), so the get the CA address using
> 
> s/the //

hmmm... CA is Calling Area, so

   "get the Calling Area address using RIP-relative"
   "get Calling Area address using RIP-relative..."

The first one sound more correct to me.

> 
>> +	 * RIP-relative addressing.
>> +	 */
>> +	pa = (u64)&RIP_REL_REF(boot_svsm_ca_page);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Switch over to the boot SVSM CA while the current CA is still
>> +	 * addressable. There is no GHCB at this point so use the MSR protocol.
>> +	 *
>> +	 * SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA call:
>> +	 *   RAX = 0 (Protocol=0, CallID=0)
>> +	 *   RCX = New CA GPA
>> +	 */
>> +	call.caa = __svsm_get_caa();
>> +	call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA);
>> +	call.rcx = pa;
>> +	ret = svsm_protocol(&call);
>> +	if (ret != SVSM_SUCCESS)
>> +		panic("Can't remap the SVSM CA, ret=%#x (%d)\n", ret, ret);
>> +
>> +	boot_svsm_caa = (struct svsm_ca *)pa;
>> +	boot_svsm_caa_pa = pa;
> 
> Huh, setup_svsm_ca() already assigned those...

setup_svsm_ca() assigned the ones from the secrets page. The kernel now 
switches to using its own CA.

> 
>>   bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   {
>>   	struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
>> @@ -2108,12 +2245,7 @@ bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   
>>   	setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
>>   
>> -	/*
>> -	 * Record the SVSM Calling Area address (CAA) if the guest is not
>> -	 * running at VMPL0. The CA will be used to communicate with the
>> -	 * SVSM to perform the SVSM services.
>> -	 */
>> -	setup_svsm_ca(cc_info);
>> +	setup_svsm(cc_info);
>>   
>>   	/*
>>   	 * The CC blob will be used later to access the secrets page. Cache
>> @@ -2306,3 +2438,12 @@ void sev_show_status(void)
>>   	}
>>   	pr_cont("\n");
>>   }
>> +
>> +void __init snp_remap_svsm_ca(void)
>> +{
>> +	if (!vmpl)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/* Update the CAA to a proper kernel address */
>> +	boot_svsm_caa = &boot_svsm_ca_page;
>> +}
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
>> index 422602f6039b..6155020e4d2d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
>> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
>>   /*
>>    * AMD Memory Encryption Support
>>    *
>> - * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
>> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> 
> Are we doing that now?

Looks like a leftover change... will remove it.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

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