linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] implement OA2_CRED

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Message-ID: <20240508-flugverbindung-sonnig-dcfa4971152e@brauner>
Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 09:32:10 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Stas Sergeev <stsp2@...dex.ru>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Stefan Metzmacher <metze@...ba.org>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, 
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, 
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>, 
	Alexander Aring <alex.aring@...il.com>, David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>, 
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] implement OA2_CRED_INHERIT flag for openat2()

On Tue, May 07, 2024 at 01:38:42PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 12:42 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > > With my kernel hat on, maybe I agree.  But with my *user* hat on, I
> > > think I pretty strongly disagree.  Look, idmapis lousy for
> > > unprivileged use:
> > >
> > > $ install -m 0700 -d test_directory
> > > $ echo 'hi there' >test_directory/file
> > > $ podman run -it --rm
> > > --mount=type=bind,src=test_directory,dst=/tmp,idmap [debian-slim]
> >
> > $ podman run -it --rm --mount=type=bind,src=test_directory,dst=/tmp,idmap [debian-slim]
> >
> > as an unprivileged user doesn't use idmapped mounts at all. So I'm not
> > sure what this is showing. I suppose you're talking about idmaps in
> > general.
> 
> Meh, fair enough.  But I don't think this would have worked any better
> with privilege.
> 
> Can idmaps be programmed by an otherwise unprivileged owner of a
> userns and a mountns inside?

Yes, but only for userns mountable filesystems that support idmapped
mounts. IOW, you need privilege over the superblock and the idmapping
you're trying to use.

> 
> > Many idmappings to one is in principle possible and I've noted that idea
> > down as a possible extension at
> > https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features quite a while (2 years?) ago.
> >
> > > I haven't looked at the idmap implementation nearly enough to have any
> > > opinion as to whether squashing UID is practical or whether there's
> >
> > It's doable. The interesting bit to me was that if we want to allow
> > writes we'd need a way to determine what the uid/gid would be to write
> > down. Imho, that's not super difficult to solve though. The most obvious
> > one is that userspace can just determine it when creating the idmapped
> > mount.
> 
> Seems reasonable to me.  If this is set up by someone unprivileged, it
> would need to be that uid/gid.