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Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 17:33:15 -0700 From: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@...osinc.com> To: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com> Cc: paul.walmsley@...ive.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, broonie@...nel.org, Szabolcs.Nagy@....com, kito.cheng@...ive.com, keescook@...omium.org, ajones@...tanamicro.com, conor.dooley@...rochip.com, cleger@...osinc.com, atishp@...shpatra.org, alex@...ti.fr, bjorn@...osinc.com, alexghiti@...osinc.com, samuel.holland@...ive.com, conor@...nel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, devicetree@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, palmer@...belt.com, aou@...s.berkeley.edu, robh+dt@...nel.org, krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@...aro.org, oleg@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, arnd@...db.de, ebiederm@...ssion.com, Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, vbabka@...e.cz, lstoakes@...il.com, shuah@...nel.org, brauner@...nel.org, andy.chiu@...ive.com, jerry.shih@...ive.com, hankuan.chen@...ive.com, greentime.hu@...ive.com, evan@...osinc.com, xiao.w.wang@...el.com, apatel@...tanamicro.com, mchitale@...tanamicro.com, dbarboza@...tanamicro.com, sameo@...osinc.com, shikemeng@...weicloud.com, willy@...radead.org, vincent.chen@...ive.com, guoren@...nel.org, samitolvanen@...gle.com, songshuaishuai@...ylab.org, gerg@...nel.org, heiko@...ech.de, bhe@...hat.com, jeeheng.sia@...rfivetech.com, cyy@...self.name, maskray@...gle.com, ancientmodern4@...il.com, mathis.salmen@...sal.de, cuiyunhui@...edance.com, bgray@...ux.ibm.com, mpe@...erman.id.au, baruch@...s.co.il, alx@...nel.org, david@...hat.com, catalin.marinas@....com, revest@...omium.org, josh@...htriplett.org, shr@...kernel.io, deller@....de, omosnace@...hat.com, ojeda@...nel.org, jhubbard@...dia.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/29] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 04:34:48PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote: > Sending out v3 for cpu assisted riscv user mode control flow integrity. > > v2 [9] was sent a week ago for this riscv usermode control flow integrity > enabling. RFC patchset was (v1) early this year (January) [7]. > > changes in v3 > -------------- > envcfg: > logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been > picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in > this series. > > dt-bindings: > As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is > in public review > > arch_is_shadow_stack change: > arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack > > hwprobe: > zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe > > selftests: > As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore > Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which > will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed > separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit. > > changes in v2 > --------------- > As part of testing effort, compiled a rootfs with shadow stack and landing > pad enabled (libraries and binaries) and booted to shell. As part of long > running tests, I have been able to run some spec 2006 benchmarks [8] (here > link is provided only for list of benchmarks that were tested for long > running tests, excel sheet provided here actually is for some static stats > like code size growth on spec binaries). Thus converting from RFC to > regular patchset. > > Securing control-flow integrity for usermode requires following > > - Securing forward control flow : All callsites must reach > reach a target that they actually intend to reach. > > - Securing backward control flow : All function returns must > return to location where they were called from. > > This patch series use riscv cpu extension `zicfilp` [2] to secure forward > control flow and `zicfiss` [2] to secure backward control flow. `zicfilp` > enforces that all indirect calls or jmps must land on a landing pad instr > and label embedded in landing pad instr must match a value programmed in > `x7` register (at callsite via compiler). `zicfiss` introduces shadow stack > which can only be writeable via shadow stack instructions (sspush and > ssamoswap) and thus can't be tampered with via inadvertent stores. More > details about extension can be read from [2] and there are details in > documentation as well (in this patch series). > > Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow > integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel. > > Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime > (specifically expected from dynamic loader). There has been a lot of earlier > discussion on the enabling topic around x86 shadow stack enabling [3, 4, 5] and > overall consensus had been to let dynamic loader (or usermode) to decide for > enabling the feature. > > This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack > and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv. arm64 is expected > to implement shadow stack part of these arch agnostic `prctls` [6] > > Changes since last time > *********************** > > Spec changes > ------------ > - Forward cfi spec has become much simpler. `lpad` instruction is pseudo for > `auipc rd, <20bit_imm>`. `lpad` checks x7 against 20bit embedded in instr. > Thus label width is 20bit. > > - Shadow stack management instructions are reduced to > sspush - to push x1/x5 on shadow stack > sspopchk - pops from shadow stack and comapres with x1/x5. > ssamoswap - atomically swap value on shadow stack. > rdssp - reads current shadow stack pointer > > - Shadow stack accesses on readonly memory always raise AMO/store page fault. > `sspopchk` is load but if underlying page is readonly, it'll raise a store > page fault. It simplifies hardware and kernel for COW handling for shadow > stack pages. > > - riscv defines a new exception type `software check exception` and control flow > violations raise software check exception. > > - enabling controls for shadow stack and landing are in xenvcfg CSR and controls > lower privilege mode enabling. As an example senvcfg controls enabling for U and > menvcfg controls enabling for S mode. > > core mm shadow stack enabling > ----------------------------- > Shadow stack for x86 usermode are now in mainline and thus this patch > series builds on top of that for arch-agnostic mm related changes. Big > thanks and shout out to Rick Edgecombe for that. > > selftests > --------- > Created some minimal selftests to test the patch series. > > > [1] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ > [2] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi > [3] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZWHcBq0bJ+15eeKs@finisterre.sirena.org.uk/T/#mb121cd8b33d564e64234595a0ec52211479cf474 > [4] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ > [5] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wgP5mk3poVeejw16Asbid0ghDt4okHnWaWKLBkRhQntRA@mail.gmail.com/ > [6] - https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-2-201c483bd775@kernel.org/ > [7] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ > [8] - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_cHGH4ctNVvFRiS7hW9dEGKtXLAJ3aX4Z_iTSa3Tw2U/edit#gid=0 > [9] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240329044459.3990638-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ > This is a note for people wanting to test this series. 1. Need a toolchain that has CFI support $ git clone git@...hub.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev $ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static" $ make -j$(nproc) 2. QEMU $ git clone git@...hub.com:deepak0414/qemu.git -b zicfilp_zicfiss_mar24_spec_v8.1.1 $ cd qemu $ mkdir build $ cd build $ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu $ make -j$(nproc) 3. OpenSBI $ git clone git@...hub.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b cfi_spec_split_opensbi $ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic 4. Linux Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain supports it. $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig $ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) 5. Running Modify your qemu command to have: -bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin -cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true - Charlie
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