linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v18 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs

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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTK4WS6BOXqLJ4sNKXR9a17gT3vXJUBc1F11cZ_QaOYBA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 15:55:01 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: ebiggers@...nel.org
Cc: Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>, corbet@....net, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, 
	jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, tytso@....edu, axboe@...nel.dk, 
	agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...nel.org, eparis@...hat.com, 
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, fsverity@...ts.linux.dev, 
	linux-block@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...ts.linux.dev, audit@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 16/21] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in
 signatures to LSMs

On Fri, May 3, 2024 at 6:32 PM Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
> authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
> signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
> e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
> files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
> a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
> control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
> could be established to permit the execution of all files with verified
> built-in fsverity signatures while restricting kernel module loading
> from specified fsverity files via fsverity digests.
>
> The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
> fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
> is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
> that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
> subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
> signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
> crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
> effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
> stack interactions.
>
> The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
> documentation in fsverity.rst.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>

Eric, are you okay with the fs-verity patches in v18?  If so, it would
be nice to get your ACK on this patch at the very least.

While it looks like there may be a need for an additional respin to
address some new/different feedback from the device-mapper folks, that
shouldn't affect the fs-verity portions of the patchset.

-- 
paul-moore.com