linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal

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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wh_GHCwCiC-ZR=idjNEb0xZq20=fQnQxnjGkiq-ba5DLg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 21:14:37 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@...nbsd.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, jeffxu@...omium.org, 
	keescook@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com, sroettger@...gle.com, 
	gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, usama.anjum@...labora.com, 
	Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, surenb@...gle.com, merimus@...gle.com, 
	rdunlap@...radead.org, jeffxu@...gle.com, jorgelo@...omium.org, 
	groeck@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, pedro.falcato@...il.com, 
	dave.hansen@...el.com, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal

On Tue, 14 May 2024 at 20:36, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> Guys, if you let untrusted code execute random system calls, the whole
> "look, now unmap() acts oddly" IS THE LEAST OF YOUR ISSUES.

Side note: it doesn't even help to make things "atomic". munmap() acts
oddly whether it fals completely or whether it fails partially, and if
the user doesn't check the result, neither case is great.

If you want to have some "hardened mseal()", you make any attempt to
change a mseal'ed memory area be a fatal error. The whole "atomic or
not" is a complete red herring.

I'd certainly be ok with that. If the point of mseal is "you can't
change this mapping", then anybody who tries to change it is obviously
untrustworthy, and killing the whole thing sounds perfectly sane to
me.

Maybe that's a first valid use-case for the flags argument.

            Linus