linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] x86/sgx: Explicitly give up the CPU in EDMM's ioctl() to avoid softlockup

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Message-Id: <D1A7EBO71WXC.P08C5KQ97AA0@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 15:06:18 +0300
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Bojun Zhu" <zhubojun.zbj@...group.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: <reinette.chatre@...el.com>, 刘双(轩屹)
 <ls123674@...group.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/1] x86/sgx: Explicitly give up the CPU in
 EDMM's ioctl() to avoid softlockup

On Wed May 15, 2024 at 9:55 AM EEST, Bojun Zhu wrote:
> EDMM's ioctl()s support batch operations, which may be
> time-consuming. Try to explicitly give up the CPU as the prefix
> operation at the every begin of "for loop" in
> sgx_enclave_{ modify_types | restrict_permissions | remove_pages}
> to give other tasks a chance to run, and avoid softlockup warning.
>
> Additionally perform pending signals check as the prefix operation,
> and introduce sgx_check_signal_and_resched(),
> which wraps all the checks.
>
> The following has been observed on Linux v6.9-rc5 with kernel
> preemptions disabled(by configuring "PREEMPT_NONE=y"), when kernel
> is requested to restrict page permissions of a large number of EPC pages.
>
>     ------------[ cut here ]------------
>     watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 22s!
>     ...
>     RIP: 0010:sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions+0xba/0x1f0
>     ...
>     Call Trace:
>      sgx_ioctl
>      __x64_sys_ioctl
>      x64_sys_call
>      do_syscall_64
>      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
>     ------------[ end trace ]------------
>

Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>

> Signed-off-by: Bojun Zhu <zhubojun.zbj@...group.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> index b65ab214bdf5..6199f483143e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
> @@ -365,6 +365,20 @@ static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Check signals and invoke scheduler. Return true for a pending signal.
> + */
> +static bool sgx_check_signal_and_resched(void)
> +{
> +	if (signal_pending(current))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	if (need_resched())
> +		cond_resched();
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
>   * @encl:       an enclave pointer
> @@ -409,7 +423,7 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
>  	struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;
>  	struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
>  	unsigned long c;
> -	int ret;
> +	int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
>  	if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) ||
>  	    test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
> @@ -432,15 +446,8 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	for (c = 0 ; c < add_arg.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> -		if (signal_pending(current)) {
> -			if (!c)
> -				ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
> -
> +		if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
>  			break;
> -		}
> -
> -		if (need_resched())
> -			cond_resched();
>  
>  		ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c,
>  					&secinfo, add_arg.flags);
> @@ -740,12 +747,15 @@ sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
>  	unsigned long addr;
>  	unsigned long c;
>  	void *epc_virt;
> -	int ret;
> +	int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
>  	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
>  	secinfo.flags = modp->permissions & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
>  
>  	for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
> +			goto out;
> +
>  		addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
>  
>  		sgx_reclaim_direct();
> @@ -898,7 +908,7 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
>  	unsigned long addr;
>  	unsigned long c;
>  	void *epc_virt;
> -	int ret;
> +	int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
>  	page_type = modt->page_type & SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
>  
> @@ -913,6 +923,9 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
>  	secinfo.flags = page_type << 8;
>  
>  	for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
> +			goto out;
> +
>  		addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;
>  
>  		sgx_reclaim_direct();
> @@ -1095,12 +1108,15 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
>  	unsigned long addr;
>  	unsigned long c;
>  	void *epc_virt;
> -	int ret;
> +	int ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
>  	memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
>  	secinfo.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
>  
>  	for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		if (sgx_check_signal_and_resched())
> +			goto out;
> +
>  		addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;
>  
>  		sgx_reclaim_direct();

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>

BR, Jarkko