linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if kvm_zap_gfn

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Message-ID: <621f313d3ab43e3d5988a7192a047de588e4c1f5.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 13:27:53 +0000
From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
To: "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "pbonzini@...hat.com"
	<pbonzini@...hat.com>, "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>, "Edgecombe,
 Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
CC: "sagis@...gle.com" <sagis@...gle.com>, "dmatlack@...gle.com"
	<dmatlack@...gle.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "isaku.yamahata@...il.com"
	<isaku.yamahata@...il.com>, "Zhao, Yan Y" <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, "Aktas,
 Erdem" <erdemaktas@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if kvm_zap_gfn_range() is
 called for TDX

On Tue, 2024-05-14 at 17:59 -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> When virtualizing some CPU features, KVM uses kvm_zap_gfn_range() to zap
> guest mappings so they can be faulted in with different PTE properties.
> 
> For TDX private memory this technique is fundamentally not possible.
> Remapping private memory requires the guest to "accept" it, and also the
> needed PTE properties are not currently supported by TDX for private
> memory.
> 
> These CPU features are:
> 1) MTRR update
> 2) CR0.CD update
> 3) Non-coherent DMA status update
> 4) APICV update
> 
> Since they cannot be supported, they should be blocked from being
> exercised by a TD. In the case of CRO.CD, the feature is fundamentally not
> supported for TDX as it cannot see the guest registers. For APICV
> inhibit it in future changes.
> 
> Guest MTRR support is more of an interesting case. Supported versions of
> the TDX module fix the MTRR CPUID bit to 1, but as previously discussed,
> it is not possible to fully support the feature. This leaves KVM with a
> few options:
>  - Support a modified version of the architecture where the caching
>    attributes are ignored for private memory.
>  - Don't support MTRRs and treat the set MTRR CPUID bit as a TDX Module
>    bug.
> 
> With the additional consideration that likely guest MTRR support in KVM
> will be going away, the later option is the best. Prevent MTRR MSR writes
> from calling kvm_zap_gfn_range() in future changes.
> 
> Lastly, the most interesting case is non-coherent DMA status updates.
> There isn't a way to reject the call. KVM is just notified that there is a
> non-coherent DMA device attached, and expected to act accordingly. For
> normal VMs today, that means to start respecting guest PAT. However,
> recently there has been a proposal to avoid doing this on selfsnoop CPUs
> (see link). On such CPUs it should not be problematic to simply always
> configure the EPT to honor guest PAT. In future changes TDX can enforce
> this behavior for shared memory, resulting in shared memory always
> respecting guest PAT for TDX. So kvm_zap_gfn_range() will not need to be
> called in this case either.
> 
> Unfortunately, this will result in different cache attributes between
> private and shared memory, as private memory is always WB and cannot be
> changed by the VMM on current TDX modules. But it can't really be helped
> while also supporting non-coherent DMA devices.
> 
> Since all callers will be prevented from calling kvm_zap_gfn_range() in
> future changes, report a bug and terminate the guest if other future
> changes to KVM result in triggering kvm_zap_gfn_range() for a TD.
> 
> For lack of a better method currently, use kvm_gfn_shared_mask() to
> determine if private memory cannot be zapped (as in TDX, the only VM type
> that sets it).
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240309010929.1403984-6-seanjc@google.com/
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> ---
> TDX MMU Part 1:
>  - Remove support from "KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Zap leafs only for private memory"
>  - Add this KVM_BUG_ON() instead
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 11 ++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index d5cf5b15a10e..808805b3478d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -6528,8 +6528,17 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
>  
>  	flush = kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end);
>  
> -	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
> +	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
> +		/*
> +		 * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when MTRR or PAT memory
> +		 * type was changed.  TDX can't handle zapping the private
> +		 * mapping, but it's ok because KVM doesn't support either of
> +		 * those features for TDX. In case a new caller appears, BUG
> +		 * the VM if it's called for solutions with private aliases.
> +		 */
> +		KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
>  		flush = kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end, flush);
> +	}
>  
>  	if (flush)
>  		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);

kvm_zap_gfn_range() looks a generic function.  I think it makes more sense
to let the callers to explicitly check whether VM is TDX guest and do the
KVM_BUG_ON()?