linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 24/27] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace

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Message-ID: <ZkYauRJBhaw9P1A_@google.com>
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 07:39:53 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...el.com, 
	x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	peterz@...radead.org, chao.gao@...el.com, mlevitsk@...hat.com, 
	john.allen@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 24/27] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and
 advertise to userspace

On Thu, May 16, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
> On 5/2/2024 7:15 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Sun, Feb 18, 2024, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > > @@ -696,6 +697,20 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> > >   		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
> > >   	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> > >   		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
> > > +	/*
> > > +	 * Don't use boot_cpu_has() to check availability of IBT because the
> > > +	 * feature bit is cleared in boot_cpu_data when ibt=off is applied
> > > +	 * in host cmdline.
> > I'm not convinced this is a good reason to diverge from the host kernel  E.g.
> > PCID and many other features honor the host setup, I don't see what makes IBT
> > special.
> > 
> > 
> Hi, Sean,
> We synced the issue internally, and got conclusion that KVM should honor host
> IBT config.  In this case IBT bit in boot_cpu_data should be honored.  With
> this policy, it can avoid CPUID confusion to guest side due to host ibt=off
> config.

What was the reasoning?  CPUID confusion is a weak justification, e.g. it's not
like the guest has visibility into the host kernel, and raw CPUID will still show
IBT support in the host.

On the other hand, I can definitely see folks wanting to expose IBT to guests
when running non-complaint host kernels, especially when live migration is in
play, i.e. when hiding IBT from the guest will actively cause problems.