lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20240516172703.GK168153@ls.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 10:27:03 -0700
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	isaku.yamahata@...il.com, erdemaktas@...gle.com, sagis@...gle.com,
	yan.y.zhao@...el.com, dmatlack@...gle.com,
	isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if kvm_zap_gfn_range() is
 called for TDX

On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 01:21:40PM +1200,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com> wrote:

> On 16/05/2024 12:15 pm, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 10:17:50AM +1200,
> > "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > On 16/05/2024 4:22 am, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > > > On Wed, May 15, 2024 at 08:34:37AM -0700,
> > > > Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > > > index d5cf5b15a10e..808805b3478d 100644
> > > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > > > @@ -6528,8 +6528,17 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
> > > > > >    	flush = kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end);
> > > > > > -	if (tdp_mmu_enabled)
> > > > > > +	if (tdp_mmu_enabled) {
> > > > > > +		/*
> > > > > > +		 * kvm_zap_gfn_range() is used when MTRR or PAT memory
> > > > > > +		 * type was changed.  TDX can't handle zapping the private
> > > > > > +		 * mapping, but it's ok because KVM doesn't support either of
> > > > > > +		 * those features for TDX. In case a new caller appears, BUG
> > > > > > +		 * the VM if it's called for solutions with private aliases.
> > > > > > +		 */
> > > > > > +		KVM_BUG_ON(kvm_gfn_shared_mask(kvm), kvm);
> > > > > 
> > > > > Please stop using kvm_gfn_shared_mask() as a proxy for "is this TDX".  Using a
> > > > > generic name quite obviously doesn't prevent TDX details for bleeding into common
> > > > > code, and dancing around things just makes it all unnecessarily confusing.
> > > > > 
> > > > > If we can't avoid bleeding TDX details into common code, my vote is to bite the
> > > > > bullet and simply check vm_type.
> > > > 
> > > > TDX has several aspects related to the TDP MMU.
> > > > 1) Based on the faulting GPA, determine which KVM page table to walk.
> > > >      (private-vs-shared)
> > > > 2) Need to call TDX SEAMCALL to operate on Secure-EPT instead of direct memory
> > > >      load/store.  TDP MMU needs hooks for it.
> > > > 3) The tables must be zapped from the leaf. not the root or the middle.
> > > > 
> > > > For 1) and 2), what about something like this?  TDX backend code will set
> > > > kvm->arch.has_mirrored_pt = true; I think we will use kvm_gfn_shared_mask() only
> > > > for address conversion (shared<->private).
> > > > 
> > > > For 1), maybe we can add struct kvm_page_fault.walk_mirrored_pt
> > > >           (or whatever preferable name)?
> > > > 
> > > > For 3), flag of memslot handles it.
> > > > 
> > > > ---
> > > >    arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +++
> > > >    1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > > index aabf1648a56a..218b575d24bd 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> > > > @@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
> > > >    	u8 vm_type;
> > > >    	bool has_private_mem;
> > > >    	bool has_protected_state;
> > > > +	bool has_mirrored_pt;
> > > >    	struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
> > > >    	struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
> > > >    	struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
> > > > @@ -2171,8 +2172,10 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
> > > >    #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
> > > >    #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
> > > > +#define kvm_arch_has_mirrored_pt(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_mirrored_pt)
> > > >    #else
> > > >    #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
> > > > +#define kvm_arch_has_mirrored_pt(kvm) false
> > > >    #endif
> > > >    static inline u16 kvm_read_ldt(void)
> > > 
> > > I think this 'has_mirrored_pt' (or a better name) is better, because it
> > > clearly conveys it is for the "page table", but not the actual page that any
> > > page table entry maps to.
> > > 
> > > AFAICT we need to split the concept of "private page table itself" and the
> > > "memory type of the actual GFN".
> > > 
> > > E.g., both SEV-SNP and TDX has concept of "private memory" (obviously), but
> > > I was told only TDX uses a dedicated private page table which isn't directly
> > > accessible for KVV.  SEV-SNP on the other hand just uses normal page table +
> > > additional HW managed table to make sure the security.
> > 
> > kvm_mmu_page_role.is_private is not good name now. Probably is_mirrored_pt or
> > need_callback or whatever makes sense.
> > 
> > 
> > > In other words, I think we should decide whether to invoke TDP MMU callback
> > > for private mapping (the page table itself may just be normal one) depending
> > > on the fault->is_private, but not whether the page table is private:
> > > 
> > > 	if (fault->is_private && kvm_x86_ops->set_private_spte)
> > > 		kvm_x86_set_private_spte(...);
> > > 	else
> > > 		tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(...);
> > 
> > This doesn't work for two reasons.
> > 
> > - We need to pass down struct kvm_page_fault fault deep only for this.
> >    We could change the code in such way.
> > 
> > - We don't have struct kvm_page_fault fault for zapping case.
> >    We could create a dummy one and pass it around.
> 
> For both above, we don't necessarily need the whole 'kvm_page_fault', we
> just need:
> 
>  1) GFN
>  2) Whether it is private (points to private memory to be precise)
>  3) use a separate private page table.

Ok, so you suggest passing around necessary info (if missing) somehow.


> > Essentially the issue is how to pass down is_private or stash the info
> > somewhere or determine it somehow.  Options I think of are
> > 
> > - Pass around fault:
> >    Con: fault isn't passed down
> >    Con: Create fake fault for zapping case >
> > - Stash it in struct tdp_iter and pass around iter:
> >    Pro: work for zapping case
> >    Con: we need to change the code to pass down tdp_iter >
> > - Pass around is_private (or mirrored_pt or whatever):
> >    Pro: Don't need to add member to some structure
> >    Con: We need to pass it around still. >
> > - Stash it in kvm_mmu_page:
> >    The patch series uses kvm_mmu_page.role.
> >    Pro: We don't need to pass around because we know struct kvm_mmu_page
> >    Con: Need to twist root page allocation
> 
> I don't think using kvm_mmu_page.role is correct.
> 
> If kvm_mmu_page.role is private, we definitely can assume the faulting
> address is private; but otherwise the address can be both private or shared.

What do you mean by the last sentence.  For example, do you mean memslot
deletion?  In that case, we need to GPA with shared bit for shared PT, GPA
without shared bit for mirrored/private PT.  Or do you mean something else?


> > - Use gfn. kvm_is_private_gfn(kvm, gfn):
> >    Con: The use of gfn is confusing.  It's too TDX specific.
> > 
> > 
> > > And the 'has_mirrored_pt' should be only used to select the root of the page
> > > table that we want to operate on.
> > 
> > We can add one more bool to struct kvm_page_fault.follow_mirrored_pt or
> > something to represent it.  We can initialize it in __kvm_mmu_do_page_fault().
> > 
> > .follow_mirrored_pt = kvm->arch.has_mirrored_pt && kvm_is_private_gpa(gpa);
> > 
> > 
> > > This also gives a chance that if there's anything special needs to be done
> > > for page allocated for the "non-leaf" middle page table for SEV-SNP, it can
> > > just fit.
> > 
> > Can you please elaborate on this?
> 
> I meant SEV-SNP may have it's own version of link_private_spt().
> 
> I haven't looked into it, and it may not needed from hardware's perspective,
> but providing such chance certainly doesn't hurt and is more flexible IMHO.

It doesn't need TDP MMU hooks.
-- 
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ