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Message-ID: <Zkd28IN8KvyD4GIX@google.com>
Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 09:12:45 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/kvm/tdx: Save %rbp in TDX_MODULE_CALL
On Fri, May 17, 2024, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2024 at 02:14:50PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> > While testing TDX host support patches, a crash of the host has been
> > observed a few instructions after doing a seamcall. Reason was a
> > clobbered %rbp (set to 0), which occurred in spite of the TDX module
> > offering the feature NOT to modify %rbp across TDX module calls.
> >
> > In order not having to build the host kernel with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER,
> > save %rbp across a seamcall/tdcall.
>
> There's a feature in TDX module 1.5 that prevents RBP modification across
> TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL. See NO_RBP_MOD in TDX Module 1.5 ABI spec.
LOL, "feature". How was clobbering RBP not treated as a bug? I'm party joking,
but also quite serious. Unless I'm missing something, the guest ABI changes
based on whether or not NO_RBP_MOD is enabled, as a TDVMCALL that was previously
valid would now fail if the guest attempts to expose RBP to the host.
The whole point of Intel defining a guest-host ABI is to allow interoperability
between hypervisors and guests. Allowing the hypervisor to arbitrarily change the
ABI is asinine.
> I think it has to be enabled for all TDs and TDX modules that don't
> support it need to be rejected.
Yes, because as above, IIUC it's a breaking change for the guest ABI.
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