linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key

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Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 02:51:20 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()

'scratch' is never freed. Fix this by calling kfree() in the success, and
in the error case.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # +v5.13
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index dfeec06301ce..c6882f5d094f 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 	u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
 	u8 *priv, *pub;
 	u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
 	priv = src;
@@ -57,8 +58,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
 		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
 		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
-		if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode"))
-			return PTR_ERR(w);
+		if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(w);
+			goto err;
+		}
 		work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
 	}
 
@@ -69,8 +72,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 	 * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
 	 */
 	if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
-		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
-		return -EINVAL;
+		 "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
 	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
@@ -79,10 +84,17 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 	work1 = payload->blob;
 	work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
 				     scratch, work - scratch);
-	if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed"))
-		return PTR_ERR(work1);
+	if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(work1);
+		goto err;
+	}
 
+	kfree(scratch);
 	return work1 - payload->blob;
+
+err:
+	kfree(scratch);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 struct tpm2_key_context {
-- 
2.45.1