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Message-ID: <d62b162d-acb3-2fa7-085e-79da3278091a@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 17:07:24 +0800
From: Baokun Li <libaokun@...weicloud.com>
To: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@...ux.alibaba.com>, netfs@...ts.linux.dev,
 dhowells@...hat.com, jlayton@...nel.org
Cc: hsiangkao@...ux.alibaba.com, zhujia.zj@...edance.com,
 linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, yangerkun@...wei.com, houtao1@...wei.com,
 yukuai3@...wei.com, wozizhi@...wei.com, Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>,
 libaokun@...weicloud.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 08/12] cachefiles: never get a new anonymous fd if
 ondemand_id is valid

On 2024/5/20 16:43, Jingbo Xu wrote:
>
> On 5/15/24 4:45 PM, libaokun@...weicloud.com wrote:
>> From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
>>
>> Now every time the daemon reads an open request, it gets a new anonymous fd
>> and ondemand_id. With the introduction of "restore", it is possible to read
>> the same open request more than once, and therefore an object can have more
>> than one anonymous fd.
>>
>> If the anonymous fd is not unique, the following concurrencies will result
>> in an fd leak:
>>
>>       t1     |         t2         |          t3
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>   cachefiles_ondemand_init_object
>>    cachefiles_ondemand_send_req
>>     REQ_A = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + data_len)
>>     wait_for_completion(&REQ_A->done)
>>              cachefiles_daemon_read
>>               cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
>>                REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
>>                cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
>>                  load->fd = fd0
>>                  ondemand_id = object_id0
>>                                    ------ restore ------
>>                                    cachefiles_ondemand_restore
>>                                     // restore REQ_A
>>                                    cachefiles_daemon_read
>>                                     cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
>>                                      REQ_A = cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
>>                                        cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
>>                                          load->fd = fd1
>>                                          ondemand_id = object_id1
>>               process_open_req(REQ_A)
>>               write(devfd, ("copen %u,%llu", msg->msg_id, size))
>>               cachefiles_ondemand_copen
>>                xa_erase(&cache->reqs, id)
>>                complete(&REQ_A->done)
>>     kfree(REQ_A)
>>                                    process_open_req(REQ_A)
>>                                    // copen fails due to no req
>>                                    // daemon close(fd1)
>>                                    cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release
>>                                     // set object closed
>>   -- umount --
>>   cachefiles_withdraw_cookie
>>    cachefiles_ondemand_clean_object
>>     cachefiles_ondemand_init_close_req
>>      if (!cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_open(object))
>>        return -ENOENT;
>>      // The fd0 is not closed until the daemon exits.
>>
>> However, the anonymous fd holds the reference count of the object and the
>> object holds the reference count of the cookie. So even though the cookie
>> has been relinquished, it will not be unhashed and freed until the daemon
>> exits.
>>
>> In fscache_hash_cookie(), when the same cookie is found in the hash list,
>> if the cookie is set with the FSCACHE_COOKIE_RELINQUISHED bit, then the new
>> cookie waits for the old cookie to be unhashed, while the old cookie is
>> waiting for the leaked fd to be closed, if the daemon does not exit in time
>> it will trigger a hung task.
>>
>> To avoid this, allocate a new anonymous fd only if no anonymous fd has
>> been allocated (ondemand_id == 0) or if the previously allocated anonymous
>> fd has been closed (ondemand_id == -1). Moreover, returns an error if
>> ondemand_id is valid, letting the daemon know that the current userland
>> restore logic is abnormal and needs to be checked.
>>
>> Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking up cookie")
>> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
> The LOCs of this fix is quite under control.  But still it seems that
> the worst consequence is that the (potential) malicious daemon gets
> hung.  No more effect to the system or other processes.  Or does a
> non-malicious daemon have any chance having the same issue?
If we enable hung_task_panic, it may cause panic to crash the server.
>> ---
>>   fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>   1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>> index d04ddc6576e3..d2d4e27fca6f 100644
>> --- a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>> +++ b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>> @@ -14,11 +14,18 @@ static int cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release(struct inode *inode,
>>   					  struct file *file)
>>   {
>>   	struct cachefiles_object *object = file->private_data;
>> -	struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache;
>> -	struct cachefiles_ondemand_info *info = object->ondemand;
>> +	struct cachefiles_cache *cache;
>> +	struct cachefiles_ondemand_info *info;
>>   	int object_id;
>>   	struct cachefiles_req *req;
>> -	XA_STATE(xas, &cache->reqs, 0);
>> +	XA_STATE(xas, NULL, 0);
>> +
>> +	if (!object)
>> +		return 0;
>> +
>> +	info = object->ondemand;
>> +	cache = object->volume->cache;
>> +	xas.xa = &cache->reqs;
>>   
>>   	xa_lock(&cache->reqs);
>>   	spin_lock(&info->lock);
>> @@ -288,22 +295,39 @@ static int cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd(struct cachefiles_req *req)
>>   		goto err_put_fd;
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	spin_lock(&object->ondemand->lock);
>> +	if (object->ondemand->ondemand_id > 0) {
>> +		spin_unlock(&object->ondemand->lock);
>> +		/* Pair with check in cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release(). */
>> +		file->private_data = NULL;
>> +		ret = -EEXIST;
>> +		goto err_put_file;
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	file->f_mode |= FMODE_PWRITE | FMODE_LSEEK;
>>   	fd_install(fd, file);
>>   
>>   	load = (void *)req->msg.data;
>>   	load->fd = fd;
>>   	object->ondemand->ondemand_id = object_id;
>> +	spin_unlock(&object->ondemand->lock);
>>   
>>   	cachefiles_get_unbind_pincount(cache);
>>   	trace_cachefiles_ondemand_open(object, &req->msg, load);
>>   	return 0;
>>   
>> +err_put_file:
>> +	fput(file);
>>   err_put_fd:
>>   	put_unused_fd(fd);
>>   err_free_id:
>>   	xa_erase(&cache->ondemand_ids, object_id);
>>   err:
>> +	spin_lock(&object->ondemand->lock);
>> +	/* Avoid marking an opened object as closed. */
>> +	if (object->ondemand->ondemand_id <= 0)
>> +		cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_close(object);
>> +	spin_unlock(&object->ondemand->lock);
>>   	cachefiles_put_object(object, cachefiles_obj_put_ondemand_fd);
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>> @@ -386,10 +410,8 @@ ssize_t cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
>>   
>>   	if (msg->opcode == CACHEFILES_OP_OPEN) {
>>   		ret = cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd(req);
>> -		if (ret) {
>> -			cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_close(req->object);
>> +		if (ret)
>>   			goto out;
>> -		}
>>   	}
>>   
>>   	msg->msg_id = xas.xa_index;

-- 
With Best Regards,
Baokun Li


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