linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 08/12] cachefiles: never get a new anonymous fd if ondemand

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Message-ID: <5b1b2719-2123-9218-97b4-ccda8b5cb3b4@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 19:14:16 +0800
From: Baokun Li <libaokun@...weicloud.com>
To: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@...ux.alibaba.com>, netfs@...ts.linux.dev,
 dhowells@...hat.com, jlayton@...nel.org
Cc: hsiangkao@...ux.alibaba.com, zhujia.zj@...edance.com,
 linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, yangerkun@...wei.com, houtao1@...wei.com,
 yukuai3@...wei.com, wozizhi@...wei.com, Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>,
 libaokun@...weicloud.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 08/12] cachefiles: never get a new anonymous fd if
 ondemand_id is valid

On 2024/5/20 17:24, Jingbo Xu wrote:
>
> On 5/20/24 5:07 PM, Baokun Li wrote:
>> On 2024/5/20 16:43, Jingbo Xu wrote:
>>> On 5/15/24 4:45 PM, libaokun@...weicloud.com wrote:
>>>> From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
>>>>
SNIP
>>>>
>>>> To avoid this, allocate a new anonymous fd only if no anonymous fd has
>>>> been allocated (ondemand_id == 0) or if the previously allocated
>>>> anonymous
>>>> fd has been closed (ondemand_id == -1). Moreover, returns an error if
>>>> ondemand_id is valid, letting the daemon know that the current userland
>>>> restore logic is abnormal and needs to be checked.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when looking
>>>> up cookie")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
>>> The LOCs of this fix is quite under control.  But still it seems that
>>> the worst consequence is that the (potential) malicious daemon gets
>>> hung.  No more effect to the system or other processes.  Or does a
>>> non-malicious daemon have any chance having the same issue?
>> If we enable hung_task_panic, it may cause panic to crash the server.
> Then this issue has nothing to do with this patch?  As long as a
> malicious daemon doesn't close the anonymous fd after umounting, then I
> guess a following attempt of mounting cookie with the same name will
> also wait and hung there?
>
Yes, a daemon that only reads requests but doesn't process them will
cause hung，but the daemon will obey the basic constraints when we
test it.

-- 
With Best Regards,
Baokun Li