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Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 10:36:14 +0800
From: Baokun Li <libaokun@...weicloud.com>
To: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@...ux.alibaba.com>, Jeff Layton
 <jlayton@...nel.org>, netfs@...ts.linux.dev, dhowells@...hat.com
Cc: jefflexu@...ux.alibaba.com, zhujia.zj@...edance.com,
 linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, yangerkun@...wei.com, houtao1@...wei.com,
 yukuai3@...wei.com, wozizhi@...wei.com, Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>,
 libaokun@...weicloud.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] cachefiles: cyclic allocation of msg_id to avoid
 reuse

On 2024/5/20 22:56, Gao Xiang wrote:
> Hi Baokun,
>
> On 2024/5/20 21:24, Baokun Li wrote:
>> On 2024/5/20 20:54, Gao Xiang wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2024/5/20 20:42, Baokun Li wrote:
>>>> On 2024/5/20 18:04, Jeff Layton wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 2024-05-20 at 12:06 +0800, Baokun Li wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Jeff,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you very much for your review!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2024/5/19 19:11, Jeff Layton wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, 2024-05-15 at 20:51 +0800, libaokun@...weicloud.com wrote:
>>>>>>>> From: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Reusing the msg_id after a maliciously completed reopen request 
>>>>>>>> may cause
>>>>>>>> a read request to remain unprocessed and result in a hung, as 
>>>>>>>> shown below:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>          t1       |      t2       |      t3
>>>>>>>> -------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_select_req
>>>>>>>>    cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_close(A)
>>>>>>>>    cachefiles_ondemand_set_object_reopening(A)
>>>>>>>>    queue_work(fscache_object_wq, &info->work)
>>>>>>>>                   ondemand_object_worker
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(A)
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN)
>>>>>>>>                       // get msg_id 6
>>>>>>>> wait_for_completion(&req_A->done)
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read
>>>>>>>>    // read msg_id 6 req_A
>>>>>>>>    cachefiles_ondemand_get_fd
>>>>>>>>    copy_to_user
>>>>>>>>                                   // Malicious completion msg_id 6
>>>>>>>>                                   copen 6,-1
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_copen
>>>>>>>> complete(&req_A->done)
>>>>>>>>                                    // will not set the object 
>>>>>>>> to close
>>>>>>>>                                    // because ondemand_id && fd 
>>>>>>>> is valid.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                   // ondemand_object_worker() is done
>>>>>>>>                   // but the object is still reopening.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                                   // new open req_B
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_init_object(B)
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(OPEN)
>>>>>>>>                                    // reuse msg_id 6
>>>>>>>> process_open_req
>>>>>>>>    copen 6,A.size
>>>>>>>>    // The expected failed copen was executed successfully
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Expect copen to fail, and when it does, it closes fd, which 
>>>>>>>> sets the
>>>>>>>> object to close, and then close triggers reopen again. However, 
>>>>>>>> due to
>>>>>>>> msg_id reuse resulting in a successful copen, the anonymous fd 
>>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>>> closed until the daemon exits. Therefore read requests waiting 
>>>>>>>> for reopen
>>>>>>>> to complete may trigger hung task.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To avoid this issue, allocate the msg_id cyclically to avoid 
>>>>>>>> reusing the
>>>>>>>> msg_id for a very short duration of time.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Fixes: c8383054506c ("cachefiles: notify the user daemon when 
>>>>>>>> looking up cookie")
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@...wei.com>
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>    fs/cachefiles/internal.h |  1 +
>>>>>>>>    fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
>>>>>>>>    2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/internal.h b/fs/cachefiles/internal.h
>>>>>>>> index 8ecd296cc1c4..9200c00f3e98 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/fs/cachefiles/internal.h
>>>>>>>> +++ b/fs/cachefiles/internal.h
>>>>>>>> @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct cachefiles_cache {
>>>>>>>>        unsigned long            req_id_next;
>>>>>>>>        struct xarray            ondemand_ids;    /* xarray for 
>>>>>>>> ondemand_id allocation */
>>>>>>>>        u32                ondemand_id_next;
>>>>>>>> +    u32                msg_id_next;
>>>>>>>>    };
>>>>>>>>    static inline bool cachefiles_in_ondemand_mode(struct 
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_cache *cache)
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>>>>>>>> index f6440b3e7368..b10952f77472 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/fs/cachefiles/ondemand.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -433,20 +433,32 @@ static int 
>>>>>>>> cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(struct cachefiles_object *object,
>>>>>>>>            smp_mb();
>>>>>>>>            if (opcode == CACHEFILES_OP_CLOSE &&
>>>>>>>> - !cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_open(object)) {
>>>>>>>> + !cachefiles_ondemand_object_is_open(object)) {
>>>>>>>> WARN_ON_ONCE(object->ondemand->ondemand_id == 0);
>>>>>>>>                xas_unlock(&xas);
>>>>>>>>                ret = -EIO;
>>>>>>>>                goto out;
>>>>>>>>            }
>>>>>>>> -        xas.xa_index = 0;
>>>>>>>> +        /*
>>>>>>>> +         * Cyclically find a free xas to avoid msg_id reuse 
>>>>>>>> that would
>>>>>>>> +         * cause the daemon to successfully copen a stale msg_id.
>>>>>>>> +         */
>>>>>>>> +        xas.xa_index = cache->msg_id_next;
>>>>>>>>            xas_find_marked(&xas, UINT_MAX, XA_FREE_MARK);
>>>>>>>> +        if (xas.xa_node == XAS_RESTART) {
>>>>>>>> +            xas.xa_index = 0;
>>>>>>>> +            xas_find_marked(&xas, cache->msg_id_next - 1, 
>>>>>>>> XA_FREE_MARK);
>>>>>>>> +        }
>>>>>>>>            if (xas.xa_node == XAS_RESTART)
>>>>>>>>                xas_set_err(&xas, -EBUSY);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>>            xas_store(&xas, req);
>>>>>>>> -        xas_clear_mark(&xas, XA_FREE_MARK);
>>>>>>>> -        xas_set_mark(&xas, CACHEFILES_REQ_NEW);
>>>>>>>> +        if (xas_valid(&xas)) {
>>>>>>>> +            cache->msg_id_next = xas.xa_index + 1;
>>>>>>> If you have a long-standing stuck request, could this counter wrap
>>>>>>> around and you still end up with reuse?
>>>>>> Yes, msg_id_next is declared to be of type u32 in the hope that when
>>>>>> xa_index == UINT_MAX, a wrap around occurs so that msg_id_next
>>>>>> goes to zero. Limiting xa_index to no more than UINT_MAX is to avoid
>>>>>> the xarry being too deep.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If msg_id_next is equal to the id of a long-standing stuck request
>>>>>> after the wrap-around, it is true that the reuse in the above 
>>>>>> problem
>>>>>> may also occur.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But I feel that a long stuck request is problematic in itself, it 
>>>>>> means
>>>>>> that after we have sent 4294967295 requests, the first one has not
>>>>>> been processed yet, and even if we send a million requests per
>>>>>> second, this one hasn't been completed for more than an hour.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We have a keep-alive process that pulls the daemon back up as
>>>>>> soon as it exits, and there is a timeout mechanism for requests in
>>>>>> the daemon to prevent the kernel from waiting for long periods
>>>>>> of time. In other words, we should avoid the situation where
>>>>>> a request is stuck for a long period of time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you think UINT_MAX is not enough, perhaps we could raise
>>>>>> the maximum value of msg_id_next to ULONG_MAX?
>>>>>>> Maybe this should be using
>>>>>>> ida_alloc/free instead, which would prevent that too?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The id reuse here is that the kernel has finished the open request
>>>>>> req_A and freed its id_A and used it again when sending the open
>>>>>> request req_B, but the daemon is still working on req_A, so the
>>>>>> copen id_A succeeds but operates on req_B.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The id that is being used by the kernel will not be allocated here
>>>>>> so it seems that ida _alloc/free does not prevent reuse either,
>>>>>> could you elaborate a bit more how this works?
>>>>>>
>>>>> ida_alloc and free absolutely prevent reuse while the id is in use.
>>>>> That's sort of the point of those functions. Basically it uses a 
>>>>> set of
>>>>> bitmaps in an xarray to track which IDs are in use, so ida_alloc only
>>>>> hands out values which are not in use. See the comments over
>>>>> ida_alloc_range() in lib/idr.c.
>>>>>
>>>> Thank you for the explanation!
>>>>
>>>> The logic now provides the same guarantees as ida_alloc/free.
>>>> The "reused" id, indeed, is no longer in use in the kernel, but it 
>>>> is still
>>>> in use in the userland, so a multi-threaded daemon could be handling
>>>> two different requests for the same msg_id at the same time.
>>>>
>>>> Previously, the logic for allocating msg_ids was to start at 0 and 
>>>> look
>>>> for a free xas.index, so it was possible for an id to be allocated 
>>>> to a
>>>> new request just as the id was being freed.
>>>>
>>>> With the change to cyclic allocation, the kernel will not use the same
>>>> id again until INT_MAX requests have been sent, and during the time
>>>> it takes to send requests, the daemon has enough time to process
>>>> requests whose ids are still in use by the daemon, but have already
>>>> been freed in the kernel.
>>>
>>> Again, If I understand correctly, I think the main point
>>> here is
>>>
>>> wait_for_completion(&req_A->done)
>>>
>>> which could hang due to some malicious deamon.  But I think it
>>> should be switched to wait_for_completion_killable() instead. *
>>> It's up to users to kill the mount instance if there is a
>>> malicious user daemon.
>>>
>>> So in that case, hung task will not be triggered anymore, and
>>> you don't need to care about cyclic allocation too.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Gao Xiang
>> Hi Xiang,
>>
>> The problem is not as simple as you think.
>>
>> If you make it killable, it just won't trigger a hung task in
>> cachefiles_ondemand_send_req(), and the process waiting for the
>> resource in question will also be hung.
>>
>> * When the open/read request in the mount process gets stuck,
>>    the sync/drop cache will trigger a hung task panic in 
>> iterate_supers()
>>    as it waits for sb->umount to be unlocked.
>> * After umount, anonymous fd is not closed causing a hung task panic
>>    in fscache_hash_cookie() because of waiting for cookie unhash.
>> * The dentry is in a loop up state, because the read request is not 
>> being
>>    processed, another process looking for the same dentry is waiting for
>>    the previous lookup to finish, which triggers a hung task panic in
>>    d_alloc_parallel().
>
>
> As for your sb->umount, d_alloc_parallel() or even i_rwsem,
> which are all currently unkillable, also see some previous
> threads like:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CAJfpegu6v1fRAyLvFLOPUSAhx5aAGvPGjBWv-TDQjugqjUA_hQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#u 
>
>
> I don't think it's the issue of on-demand cachefiles, even
> NVMe or virtio-blk or networking can be stuck in
> .lookup, fill_sb or whatever.
>
> Which can makes sb->umount, d_alloc_parallel() or even
> i_rwsem unkillable.
>
Everyone and every company has different requirements for quality,
and if you don't think these hung_task_panic are problems, I respect
your opinion.

But the company I work for has much higher requirements for quality,
and it's not acceptable to leave these issues that have been tested out
unresolved.
>>
>> Can all this be made killable?
>
> I can understand your hung_task_panic concern but it
> sounds like a workaround to me anyway.
>
> Thanks,
> Gao Xiang
>
 From the current perspective, cyclic allocation is a valid solution to
the current msg_id collision problem, and it also makes it fairer to
copy out requests than it was before.

Thanks!

-- 
With Best Regards,
Baokun Li


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