linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1] memfd: `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should not imply `MFD_ALLOW

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALmYWFtNtyzkbUVR+cQ+3zxMf9TU4SHDoMsH0267n=8V-2ENcw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 May 2024 13:44:38 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@...tonmail.com>, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, dmitry.torokhov@...il.com, 
	dverkamp@...omium.org, hughd@...gle.com, jorgelo@...omium.org, 
	skhan@...uxfoundation.org, keescook@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] memfd: `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should not imply `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`

Hi Barnabás

Is that OK that I work on V2 ? It will be based on your V1 change and
I will also add more test cases.

Thanks
-Jeff

-

On Thu, May 23, 2024 at 12:45 PM Andrew Morton
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 22 May 2024 19:32:35 -0700 Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> > >
> > > It's a change to a userspace API, yes?  Please let's have a detailed
> > > description of why this is OK.  Why it won't affect any existing users.
> > >
> > Unfortunately, this is a breaking change that might break a
> > application if they do below:
> > memfd_create("", MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL)
> > fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE); <-- this will fail in new
> > semantics, due to mfd not being sealable.
> >
> > However, I still think the new semantics is a better, the reason is
> > due to  the sysctl: memfd_noexec_scope
> > Currently, when the sysctl  is set to MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL
> > kernel adds MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to memfd_create, and the memfd  becomes sealable.
> > E.g.
> > When the sysctl is set to MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL
> > The app calls memfd_create("",0)
> > application will get sealable memfd, which might be a surprise to application.
> >
> > If the app doesn't want this behavior, they will need one of two below
> > in current implementation.
> > 1>
> > set the sysctl: memfd_noexec_scope to 0.
> > So the kernel doesn't overwrite the mdmfd_create
> >
> > 2>
> > modify their code  to get non-sealable NOEXEC memfd.
> > memfd_create("", MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC)
> > fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_SEAL)
> >
> > The new semantics works better with the sysctl.
> >
> > Since memfd noexec is new, maybe there is no application using the
> > MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to create
> > sealable memfd. They mostly likely use
> > memfd(MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL|MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) instead.
> > I think it might benefit in the long term with the new semantics.
>
> Yes, it's new so I expect any damage will be small.  Please prepare a
> v2 which fully explains/justifies the thinking for this
> non-backward-compatible change and which include the cc:stable.
>
>