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Message-ID: <f7a5e281c48b4232a4ba74022dd3f83a@infineon.com>
Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 01:59:12 +0000
From: <Nobuaki.Tsunashima@...ineon.com>
To: <luiz.dentz@...il.com>
CC: <marcel@...tmann.org>, <linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v4] Bluetooth: btbcm: Apply
HCI_QUIRK_BROKEN_READ_TRANSMIT_POWER to CYW4373
Hi Luiz,
Thanks for your review.
>> static int btbcm_read_info(struct hci_dev *hdev) {
>> struct sk_buff *skb;
>> + u8 chip_id;
>> + u16 baseline;
>>
>> /* Read Verbose Config Version Info */
>> skb = btbcm_read_verbose_config(hdev);
>> if (IS_ERR(skb))
>> return PTR_ERR(skb);
>> -
>> + chip_id = skb->data[1];
>> + baseline = skb->data[3] | (skb->data[4] << 8);
>
>This is not really safe, you shouldn't attempt to access skb->data without first checking skb->len, actually it would be much better that >you would use skb_pull_data which does skb->len check before pulling data.
I think it could be safe because its length is checked inside btbcm_read_verbose_config() as below.
Please let me know if further checking is needed.
>>>
static struct sk_buff *btbcm_read_verbose_config(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = __hci_cmd_sync(hdev, 0xfc79, 0, NULL, HCI_INIT_TIMEOUT);
if (IS_ERR(skb)) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "BCM: Read verbose config info failed (%ld)",
PTR_ERR(skb));
return skb;
}
if (skb->len != 7) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "BCM: Verbose config length mismatch");
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
return skb;
}
<<<
Best Regards,
Nobuaki Tsunashima
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