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Message-ID: <ab9e93f0-132e-b7cc-48e0-f83463003e21@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 28 May 2024 15:57:10 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
svsm-devel@...onut-svsm.dev, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Michael Roth
<michael.roth@....com>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 08/15] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support
On 5/27/24 08:10, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:58:04AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> The SVSM specification documents an alternative method of discovery for
>> the SVSM using a reserved CPUID bit and a reserved MSR.
>
> Yes, and all your code places where you do
>
> if (vmpl)
>
> to check whether the guest is running over a SVSM should do the CPUID
> check. We should not be hardcoding the VMPL level to mean a SVSM is
> present.
The alternative method is really meant for things like UEFI runtime
services (which uses the kernels #VC handler), not the kernel directly.
Some of those checks have to be made very early, I'll see if it is
feasible to rely on the CPUID check / cpu_feature_enabled() support.
We can separate out SVSM vs VMPL, but if the kernel isn't running at
VMPL0 then it requires that an SVSM be present.
>
>>
>> For the CPUID support, the SNP CPUID table is updated to set bit 28 of
>
> s/is updated/update the.../
Ok.
>
>> the EAX register of the 0x8000001f leaf when an SVSM is present. This bit
>> has been reserved for use in this capacity.
>>
>> For the MSR support, a new reserved MSR 0xc001f000 has been defined. A #VC
>> should be generated when accessing this MSR. The #VC handler is expected
>> to ignore writes to this MSR and return the physical calling area address
>> (CAA) on reads of this MSR.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 11 +++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> index 3c7434329661..a17a81b3189b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> @@ -446,6 +446,7 @@
>> #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
>> +#define X86_FEATURE_SVSM_PRESENT (19*32+28) /* "" SNP SVSM is present */
>
> X86_FEATURE_SVSM is better right?
>
> And then we might even want to show it in /proc/cpuinfo here to really
> say that we're running over a SVSM as that might be useful info. Think
> alternate injection support for one.
Yep, will do.
>
>> /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0) /* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index e022e6eb766c..45ffa27569f4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -660,6 +660,8 @@
>> #define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132
>> #define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133
>>
>> +#define MSR_SVSM_CAA 0xc001f000
>> +
>> /* AMD Collaborative Processor Performance Control MSRs */
>> #define MSR_AMD_CPPC_CAP1 0xc00102b0
>> #define MSR_AMD_CPPC_ENABLE 0xc00102b1
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> index b415b10a0823..50db783f151e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> @@ -1561,6 +1561,8 @@ static enum es_result vc_check_opcode_bytes(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
>> static void __head setup_svsm_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
>> {
>> struct snp_secrets_page *secrets_page;
>> + struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table;
>> + unsigned int i;
>> u64 caa;
>>
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*secrets_page) != PAGE_SIZE);
>> @@ -1607,4 +1609,13 @@ static void __head setup_svsm_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
>> */
>> boot_svsm_caa = (struct svsm_ca *)caa;
>> boot_svsm_caa_pa = caa;
>> +
>> + /* Advertise the SVSM presence via CPUID. */
>> + cpuid_table = (struct snp_cpuid_table *)snp_cpuid_get_table();
>> + for (i = 0; i < cpuid_table->count; i++) {
>> + struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i];
>> +
>> + if (fn->eax_in == 0x8000001f)
>> + fn->eax |= BIT(28);
>> + }
>> }
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> index 3f4342b31736..69a756781d90 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> @@ -1326,12 +1326,29 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +static enum es_result vc_handle_svsm_caa_msr(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>
> No need for that helper. And you can reuse the exit_info_1 assignment.
> Diff ontop:
I'll incorporate this, but probably won't change the way exit_info_1 is
assigned.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 40eb547d0d6c..7a248d66227e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -1326,31 +1326,25 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static enum es_result vc_handle_svsm_caa_msr(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> -{
> - struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
> -
> - /* Writes to the SVSM CAA msr are ignored */
> - if (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30)
> - return ES_OK;
> -
> - regs->ax = lower_32_bits(this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa));
> - regs->dx = upper_32_bits(this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa));
> -
> - return ES_OK;
> -}
> -
> static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
> {
> struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
> enum es_result ret;
> u64 exit_info_1;
>
> - if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA)
> - return vc_handle_svsm_caa_msr(ctxt);
> -
> /* Is it a WRMSR? */
> - exit_info_1 = (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30) ? 1 : 0;
> + exit_info_1 = !!(ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30);
> +
> + if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA) {
> + /* Writes to the SVSM CAA msr are ignored */
> + if (exit_info_1)
> + return ES_OK;
> +
> + regs->ax = lower_32_bits(this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa));
> + regs->dx = upper_32_bits(this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa));
> +
> + return ES_OK;
> + }
>
> ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
> if (exit_info_1) {
>
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