Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 14:02:14 +0200
From: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com>
To: yunhui cui <cuiyunhui@...edance.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, 
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, 
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>, 
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>, 
	Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Ved Shanbhogue <ved@...osinc.com>, Matt Evans <mev@...osinc.com>, Dylan Jhong <dylan@...estech.com>, 
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-mips@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, 
	linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [External] [PATCH RFC/RFT v2 3/4] riscv: Stop emitting preventive
 sfence.vma for new vmalloc mappings

Hi Yunhui,

On Mon, Jun 3, 2024 at 4:26 AM yunhui cui <cuiyunhui@...edance.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Alexandre,
>
> On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 12:03 AM Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com> wrote:
> >
> > In 6.5, we removed the vmalloc fault path because that can't work (see
> > [1] [2]). Then in order to make sure that new page table entries were
> > seen by the page table walker, we had to preventively emit a sfence.vma
> > on all harts [3] but this solution is very costly since it relies on IPI.
> >
> > And even there, we could end up in a loop of vmalloc faults if a vmalloc
> > allocation is done in the IPI path (for example if it is traced, see
> > [4]), which could result in a kernel stack overflow.
> >
> > Those preventive sfence.vma needed to be emitted because:
> >
> > - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping may not be
> >   observed by the page table walker and an invalidation may be needed.
> > - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access
> >   could "miss" the new mapping and traps: in that case, we would actually
> >   only need to retry the access, no sfence.vma is required.
> >
> > So this patch removes those preventive sfence.vma and actually handles
> > the possible (and unlikely) exceptions. And since the kernel stacks
> > mappings lie in the vmalloc area, this handling must be done very early
> > when the trap is taken, at the very beginning of handle_exception: this
> > also rules out the vmalloc allocations in the fault path.
> >
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230531093817.665799-1-bjorn@kernel.org/ [1]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230801090927.2018653-1-dylan@andestech.com [2]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230725132246.817726-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com/ [3]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200508144043.13893-1-joro@8bytes.org/ [4]
> > Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h  | 18 +++++-
> >  arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h |  5 ++
> >  arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c      |  5 ++
> >  arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S            | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/riscv/mm/init.c                 |  2 +
> >  5 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > index a129dac4521d..b0d631701757 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > @@ -37,7 +37,23 @@ static inline void flush_dcache_page(struct page *page)
> >         flush_icache_mm(vma->vm_mm, 0)
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > -#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end)           flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end)
> > +extern u64 new_vmalloc[NR_CPUS / sizeof(u64) + 1];
> > +extern char _end[];
> > +#define flush_cache_vmap flush_cache_vmap
> > +static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > +       if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)start)) {
> > +               int i;
> > +
> > +               /*
> > +                * We don't care if concurrently a cpu resets this value since
> > +                * the only place this can happen is in handle_exception() where
> > +                * an sfence.vma is emitted.
> > +                */
> > +               for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_vmalloc); ++i)
> > +                       new_vmalloc[i] = -1ULL;
> > +       }
> > +}
> >  #define flush_cache_vmap_early(start, end)     local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end)
> >  #endif
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > index 5d473343634b..32631acdcdd4 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > @@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ struct thread_info {
> >         void                    *scs_base;
> >         void                    *scs_sp;
> >  #endif
> > +       /*
> > +        * Used in handle_exception() to save a0, a1 and a2 before knowing if we
> > +        * can access the kernel stack.
> > +        */
> > +       unsigned long           a0, a1, a2;
> >  };
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > index a03129f40c46..939ddc0e3c6e 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
> >         OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S9, task_struct, thread.s[9]);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S10, task_struct, thread.s[10]);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S11, task_struct, thread.s[11]);
> > +
> > +       OFFSET(TASK_TI_CPU, task_struct, thread_info.cpu);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_TI_FLAGS, task_struct, thread_info.flags);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT, task_struct, thread_info.preempt_count);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP, task_struct, thread_info.kernel_sp);
> > @@ -42,6 +44,9 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> >         OFFSET(TASK_TI_SCS_SP, task_struct, thread_info.scs_sp);
> >  #endif
> > +       OFFSET(TASK_TI_A0, task_struct, thread_info.a0);
> > +       OFFSET(TASK_TI_A1, task_struct, thread_info.a1);
> > +       OFFSET(TASK_TI_A2, task_struct, thread_info.a2);
> >
> >         OFFSET(TASK_TI_CPU_NUM, task_struct, thread_info.cpu);
> >         OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F0,  task_struct, thread.fstate.f[0]);
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > index 9d1a305d5508..c1ffaeaba7aa 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > @@ -19,6 +19,78 @@
> >
> >         .section .irqentry.text, "ax"
> >
> > +.macro new_vmalloc_check
> > +       REG_S   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +       REG_S   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +       REG_S   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +
> > +       csrr    a0, CSR_CAUSE
> > +       /* Exclude IRQs */
> > +       blt     a0, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +       /* Only check new_vmalloc if we are in page/protection fault */
> > +       li      a1, EXC_LOAD_PAGE_FAULT
> > +       beq     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_kernel_address
> > +       li      a1, EXC_STORE_PAGE_FAULT
> > +       beq     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_kernel_address
> > +       li      a1, EXC_INST_PAGE_FAULT
> > +       bne     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +_new_vmalloc_kernel_address:
> > +       /* Is it a kernel address? */
> > +       csrr    a0, CSR_TVAL
> > +       bge     a0, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +       /* Check if a new vmalloc mapping appeared that could explain the trap */
> > +
> > +       /*
> > +        * Computes:
> > +        * a0 = &new_vmalloc[BIT_WORD(cpu)]
> > +        * a1 = BIT_MASK(cpu)
> > +        */
> > +       REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_CPU(tp)
> > +       /*
> > +        * Compute the new_vmalloc element position:
> > +        * (cpu / 64) * 8 = (cpu >> 6) << 3
> > +        */
> > +       srli    a1, a2, 6
> > +       slli    a1, a1, 3
> > +       la      a0, new_vmalloc
> > +       add     a0, a0, a1
> > +       /*
> > +        * Compute the bit position in the new_vmalloc element:
> > +        * bit_pos = cpu % 64 = cpu - (cpu / 64) * 64 = cpu - (cpu >> 6) << 6
> > +        *         = cpu - ((cpu >> 6) << 3) << 3
> > +        */
> > +       slli    a1, a1, 3
> > +       sub     a1, a2, a1
> > +       /* Compute the "get mask": 1 << bit_pos */
> > +       li      a2, 1
> > +       sll     a1, a2, a1
> > +
> > +       /* Check the value of new_vmalloc for this cpu */
> > +       REG_L   a2, 0(a0)
> > +       and     a2, a2, a1
> > +       beq     a2, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +       /* Atomically reset the current cpu bit in new_vmalloc */
> > +       amoxor.w        a0, a1, (a0)
> > +
> > +       /* Only emit a sfence.vma if the uarch caches invalid entries */
> > +       ALTERNATIVE("sfence.vma", "nop", 0, RISCV_ISA_EXT_SVVPTC, 1)
> > +
> > +       REG_L   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +       REG_L   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +       REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +       csrw    CSR_SCRATCH, x0
> > +       sret
> > +
> > +_new_vmalloc_restore_context:
> > +       REG_L   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +       REG_L   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +       REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +.endm
> > +
> > +
> >  SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception)
> >         /*
> >          * If coming from userspace, preserve the user thread pointer and load
> > @@ -30,6 +102,18 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception)
> >
> >  .Lrestore_kernel_tpsp:
> >         csrr tp, CSR_SCRATCH
> > +
> > +       /*
> > +        * The RISC-V kernel does not eagerly emit a sfence.vma after each
> > +        * new vmalloc mapping, which may result in exceptions:
> > +        * - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping would not be
> > +        *   observed by the page table walker and an invalidation is needed.
> > +        * - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access
> > +        *   could "miss" the new mapping and traps: in that case, we only need
> > +        *   to retry the access, no sfence.vma is required.
> > +        */
> > +       new_vmalloc_check
> > +
> >         REG_S sp, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > index eafc4c2200f2..54c9fdeda11e 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
> >
> >  #include "../kernel/head.h"
> >
> > +u64 new_vmalloc[NR_CPUS / sizeof(u64) + 1];
> > +
> >  struct kernel_mapping kernel_map __ro_after_init;
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_map);
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_XIP_KERNEL
> > --
> > 2.39.2
> >
> >
>
> Can we consider using new_vmalloc as a percpu variable, so that we
> don't need to add a0/1/2 in thread_info?

At first, I used percpu variables. But then I realized that percpu
areas are allocated in the vmalloc area, so if somehow we take a trap
when accessing the new_vmalloc percpu variable, we could not recover
from this as we would trap forever in new_vmalloc_check. But
admittedly, not sure that can happen.

And how would that remove a0, a1 and a2 from thread_info? We'd still
need to save some registers somewhere to access the percpu variable
right?

> Also, try not to do too much
> calculation logic in new_vmalloc_check, after all, handle_exception is
> a high-frequency path. In this case, can we consider writing
> new_vmalloc_check in C language to increase readability?

If we write that in C, we don't have the control over the allocated
registers and then we can't correctly save the context.

Thanks for your interest in this patchset :)

Alex

>
> Thanks,
> Yunhui

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