Message-ID: <5b32106b-bb7b-463d-8b0b-589e3d466bf3@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 10:33:54 -0700
From: ross.philipson@...cle.com
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
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        kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com,
        trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com, ross.philipson@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub

On 6/4/24 10:27 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Jun 2024 at 19:24, <ross.philipson@...cle.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 5/31/24 6:33 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 13:00, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hello Ross,
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 31 May 2024 at 03:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
>>>>> later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
>>>>> sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
>>>>> conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
>>>>> Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the
>>>>> MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the
>>>>> very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic
>>>>> environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is
>>>>> also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel
>>>>> platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is
>>>>> responsible for measuring configuration and module information before
>>>>> it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap,
>>>>> an external initramfs, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>    Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst        |  21 +
>>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile      |   3 +-
>>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S     |  30 +
>>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S |  34 ++
>>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c     | 577 ++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>    arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S     | 725 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>    arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h       |   5 +
>>>>>    arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h  |   1 +
>>>>>    arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c          |  20 +
>>>>>    9 files changed, 1415 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>    create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
>>>>>    create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>>>>> index 4fd492cb4970..295cdf9bcbdb 100644
>>>>> --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>>>>> +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>>>>> @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ Protocol:  2.00+
>>>>>               - If 1, KASLR enabled.
>>>>>               - If 0, KASLR disabled.
>>>>>
>>>>> +  Bit 2 (kernel internal): SLAUNCH_FLAG
>>>>> +
>>>>> +       - Used internally by the setup kernel to communicate
>>>>> +         Secure Launch status to kernel proper.
>>>>> +
>>>>> +           - If 1, Secure Launch enabled.
>>>>> +           - If 0, Secure Launch disabled.
>>>>> +
>>>>>      Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG
>>>>>
>>>>>           - If 0, print early messages.
>>>>> @@ -1028,6 +1036,19 @@ Offset/size:     0x000c/4
>>>>>
>>>>>      This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs.
>>>>>
>>>>> +============   =================
>>>>> +Field name:    mle_header_offset
>>>>> +Offset/size:   0x0010/4
>>>>> +============   =================
>>>>> +
>>>>> +  This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment
>>>>> +  (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure
>>>>> +  late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have
>>>>> +  Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP
>>>>> +  following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is
>>>>> +  outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here:
>>>>> +  https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!Mng0gnPhOYZ8D02t1rYwQfY6U3uWaypJyd1T2rsWz3QNHr9GhIZ9ANB_-cgPExxX0e0KmCpda-3VX8Fj$
>>>>> +
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Could we just repaint this field as the offset relative to the start
>>>> of kernel_info rather than relative to the start of the image? That
>>>> way, there is no need for patch #1, and given that the consumer of
>>>> this field accesses it via kernel_info, I wouldn't expect any issues
>>>> in applying this offset to obtain the actual address.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>    The Image Checksum
>>>>>    ==================
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>>>>> index 9189a0e28686..9076a248d4b4 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>>>>> @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o
>>>>>    vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o
>>>>>    vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
>>>>>
>>>>> -vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o
>>>>> +vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \
>>>>> +       $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o
>>>>>
>>>>>    $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE
>>>>>           $(call if_changed,ld)
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>>>>> index 1dcb794c5479..803c9e2e6d85 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>>>>> @@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
>>>>>           pushq   $0
>>>>>           popfq
>>>>>
>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>>>>> +       /* Ensure the relocation region is coverd by a PMR */
>>>>
>>>> covered
>>>>
>>>>> +       movq    %rbx, %rdi
>>>>> +       movl    $(_bss - startup_32), %esi
>>>>> +       callq   sl_check_region
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +
>>>>>    /*
>>>>>     * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer
>>>>>     * where decompression in place becomes safe.
>>>>> @@ -462,6 +469,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
>>>>>           shrq    $3, %rcx
>>>>>           rep     stosq
>>>>>
>>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>>>>> +       /*
>>>>> +        * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area.
>>>>> +        *
>>>>> +        * *********** NOTE ***********
>>>>> +        *
>>>>> +        * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure
>>>>> +        * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't
>>>>> +        * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no
>>>>> +        * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or
>>>>> +        * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap
>>>>> +        * checks in place.
>>>>> +        */
>>>>> +       movq    %r15, %rdi
>>>>> +       callq   sl_main
>>>>> +
>>>>> +       /* Ensure the decompression location is covered by a PMR */
>>>>> +       movq    %rbp, %rdi
>>>>> +       movq    output_len(%rip), %rsi
>>>>> +       callq   sl_check_region
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +
>>>>> +       pushq   %rsi
>>>>
>>>> This looks like a rebase error.
>>>>
>>>>>           call    load_stage2_idt
>>>>>
>>>>>           /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>>>>> index c18f07181dd5..e199b87764e9 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>>>>> @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
>>>>>           /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
>>>>>           .long   SETUP_TYPE_MAX
>>>>>
>>>>> +       /* Offset to the MLE header structure */
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>>>>> +       .long   rva(mle_header)
>>>>
>>>> ... so this could just be mle_header - kernel_info, and the consumer
>>>> can do the math instead.
>>>>
>>>>> +#else
>>>>> +       .long   0
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> +
>>>>>    kernel_info_var_len_data:
>>>>>           /* Empty for time being... */
>>>>>    SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
>>>>> +
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>>>>> +       /*
>>>>> +        * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
>>>>> +        * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
>>>>> +        * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
>>>>> +        * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
>>>>> +        * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table
>>>>> +        * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
>>>>> +        * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
>>>>> +        */
>>>>> +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
>>>>> +       .long   0x9082ac5a  /* UUID0 */
>>>>> +       .long   0x74a7476f  /* UUID1 */
>>>>> +       .long   0xa2555c0f  /* UUID2 */
>>>>> +       .long   0x42b651cb  /* UUID3 */
>>>>> +       .long   0x00000034  /* MLE header size */
>>>>> +       .long   0x00020002  /* MLE version 2.2 */
>>>>> +       .long   rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
>>>>
>>>> and these should perhaps be relative to mle_header?
>>>>
>>>>> +       .long   0x00000000  /* First valid page of MLE */
>>>>> +       .long   0x00000000  /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
>>>>> +       .long   rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
>>>>
>>>> and here
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ugh never mind - these are specified externally.
>>
>> Can you clarify your follow on comment here?
>>
> 
> I noticed that -as you pointed out in your previous reply- these
> fields cannot be repainted at will, as they are defined by an external
> specification.
> 
> I'll play a bit more with this code tomorrow - I would *really* like
> to avoid the need for patch #1, as it adds another constraint on how
> we construct the boot image, and this is already riddled with legacy
> and other complications.

Yea I should have read forward through all your replies before 
responding to the first one but I think it clarified things as you point 
out here. We appreciate you help and suggestions.

Ross

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