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Message-ID: <6f0e04c2-4602-4407-9af5-f72610021a6a@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 14:41:44 -0400
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
Andreas.Fuchs@...ineon.com, James Prestwood <prestwoj@...il.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@...ttering.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type
On 6/4/24 13:23, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri May 31, 2024 at 3:35 AM EEST, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> - rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
>>> - if (rc) {
>>> - /* old form */
>>> + key = tpm2_key_decode(payload->blob, payload->blob_len);
>>> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>>> + /* Get the error code and reset the pointer to the key: */
>>> + rc = PTR_ERR(key);
>>> + key = NULL;
>>> +
>>> + if (rc == -ENOMEM)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> +
>>> + /* A sanity check, as only -EBADMSG or -ENOMEM are expected: */
>>> + if (rc != -EBADMSG)
>>> + pr_err("tpm2_key_decode(): spurious error code %d\n", rc);
>>
>> tpm2_key_decode seems simple enough that it only returns key, -ENOMEM or
>> EBADMSG.
>
> So what is your suggestion here?
You can remove the check resuling in pr_err().
>
> The reasoning here is that asymmetric keys use -EBADMSG not only as
> error but also iterator, when probing which can load a specific key.
>
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