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Message-ID: <ZmLbmriQYol2JHKe@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 18:06:18 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@...hat.com>
Cc: kexec@...ts.infradead.org, Ondrej Kozina <okozina@...hat.com>,
Milan Broz <gmazyland@...il.com>,
Thomas Staudt <tstaudt@...ibm.com>,
Daniel P . Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>,
Kairui Song <ryncsn@...il.com>,
Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@...hat.com>,
Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@...il.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing
LUKS volume keys
Hi Coiby,
On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
> LUKS is the standard for Linux disk encryption. Many users choose LUKS
> and in some use cases like Confidential VM it's mandated. With kdump
> enabled, when the 1st kernel crashes, the system could boot into the
> kdump/crash kernel and dump the memory image i.e. /proc/vmcore to a
> specified target. Currently, when dumping vmcore to a LUKS
> encrypted device, there are two problems,
I am done with this round of reviewing. The overall approach looks good
to me, while there are places to improve or fix. I have added comment on
all things I am concerned about, please check. Thanks for the effort.
By the way, do you get confirmation on the solution from encryption/keys
developer of redhat internally or upstream? With my understanding, it
looks good. It may need their confirmation or approval in some ways.
Thanks
Baoquan
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