linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 4/5] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

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Message-ID: <CALCETrWzXQMXjvL+nGq-+aLVUeiABJ46DACtLnrLXxmwh9s_dg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 10:55:17 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, patches@...ts.linux.dev, tglx@...utronix.de, 
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, 
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, 
	Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>, "Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@...hat.com>, 
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, David Hildenbrand <dhildenb@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 4/5] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 5:12 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Andy,
>
> On Mon, Jun 17, 2024 at 05:06:22PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 12:08 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on
> > > an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes
> > > the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:
> > >
> > >   ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
> >
> > Last time around, I mentioned some potential issues with this function
> > signature, and I didn't see any answer.  My specific objection was to
> > the fact that the caller passes in a pointer but not a length, and
> > this potentially makes reasoning about memory safety awkward,
> > especially if anything like CRIU is involved.
>
> Oh, I understood this backwards last time - I thought you were
> criticizing the size_t len argument, which didn't make any sense.
>
> Re-reading now, what you're suggesting is that I add an additional
> argument called `size_t opaque_len`, and then the implementation does
> something like:
>
>     if (opaque_len != sizeof(struct vgetrandom_state))
>         goto fallback_syscall;
>
> With the reasoning that falling back to syscall is better than returning
> -EINVAL, because that could happen in a natural way due to CRIU. In
> contrast, your objection to opaque_state not being aligned falling back
> to the syscall was that it should never happen ever, so -EFAULT is more
> fitting.
>
> Is that correct?

Yes, exactly.

My alternative suggestion, which is far less well formed, would be to
make the opaque argument be somehow not pointer-like and be more of an
opaque handle.  So it would be uintptr_t instead of void *, and the
user API would be built around the user getting a list of handles
instead of a block of memory.

The benefit would be a tiny bit less overhead (potentially), but the
API would need substantially more rework.  I'm not convinced that this
would be worthwhile.

--Andy