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Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 09:44:59 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject:
[tip: x86/sev] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
Commit-ID: eb65f96cb332d577b490ab9c9f5f8de8c0316076
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/eb65f96cb332d577b490ab9c9f5f8de8c0316076
Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 05 Jun 2024 10:18:51 -05:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 20:42:57 +02:00
virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL
Currently, the sev-guest driver uses the vmpck-0 key by default. When an
SVSM is present, the kernel is running at a VMPL other than 0 and the
vmpck-0 key is no longer available. If a specific vmpck key has not be
requested by the user via the vmpck_id module parameter, choose the
vmpck key based on the active VMPL level.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b88081c5d88263176849df8ea93e90a404619cab.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
---
Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 11 +++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 3 ++-
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
index e1eaf6a..9d00967 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -204,6 +204,17 @@ has taken care to make use of the SEV-SNP CPUID throughout all stages of boot.
Otherwise, guest owner attestation provides no assurance that the kernel wasn't
fed incorrect values at some point during boot.
+4. SEV Guest Driver Communication Key
+=====================================
+
+Communication between an SEV guest and the SEV firmware in the AMD Secure
+Processor (ASP, aka PSP) is protected by a VM Platform Communication Key
+(VMPCK). By default, the sev-guest driver uses the VMPCK associated with the
+VM Privilege Level (VMPL) at which the guest is running. Should this key be
+wiped by the sev-guest driver (see the driver for reasons why a VMPCK can be
+wiped), a different key can be used by reloading the sev-guest driver and
+specifying the desired key using the vmpck_id module parameter.
+
Reference
---------
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 1d0b1b2..9c6f269 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ struct svsm_call {
#define SVSM_CORE_DELETE_VCPU 3
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
+extern u8 snp_vmpl;
+
extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void __sev_es_ist_exit(void);
static __always_inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -319,7 +322,10 @@ u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status);
u64 sev_get_status(void);
void sev_show_status(void);
void snp_update_svsm_ca(void);
-#else
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#define snp_vmpl 0
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
@@ -349,7 +355,8 @@ static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; }
static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_show_status(void) { }
static inline void snp_update_svsm_ca(void) { }
-#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index 2f50910..71de531 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@
* early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
* virtual addresses.
*/
-static u8 snp_vmpl __ro_after_init;
+u8 snp_vmpl __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_vmpl);
static struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa __ro_after_init;
static u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 654290a..4597042 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest driver interface
*
- * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2024 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
*
* Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
*/
@@ -70,8 +70,15 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
u8 *vmpck;
};
-static u32 vmpck_id;
-module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444);
+/*
+ * The VMPCK ID represents the key used by the SNP guest to communicate with the
+ * SEV firmware in the AMD Secure Processor (ASP, aka PSP). By default, the key
+ * used will be the key associated with the VMPL at which the guest is running.
+ * Should the default key be wiped (see snp_disable_vmpck()), this parameter
+ * allows for using one of the remaining VMPCKs.
+ */
+static int vmpck_id = -1;
+module_param(vmpck_id, int, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
@@ -923,6 +930,10 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (!snp_dev)
goto e_unmap;
+ /* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */
+ if (vmpck_id == -1)
+ vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
+
ret = -EINVAL;
snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
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