Message-ID: <c635b2b5eceb4accba00e31c0fbbfad3@quicinc.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 15:38:44 +0000
From: "Gaurav Kashyap (QUIC)" <quic_gaurkash@...cinc.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        "dmitry.baryshkov@...aro.org"
	<dmitry.baryshkov@...aro.org>
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        Sonal Gupta <sonalg@...cinc.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 04/15] soc: qcom: ice: add hwkm support in ice

Apologies, fixed incorrect email

> Hello Eric
> 
> On 06/20/2024, 9:48 PM PDT, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 02:57:40PM +0300, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Is it possible to use both kind of keys when working on
> > > > > > > standard
> > mode?
> > > > > > > If not, it should be the user who selects what type of keys
> > > > > > > to be
> > used.
> > > > > > > Enforcing this via DT is not a way to go.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Unfortunately, that support is not there yet. When you say
> > > > > > user, do you mean to have it as a filesystem mount option?
> > > > >
> > > > > During cryptsetup time. When running e.g. cryptsetup I, as a
> > > > > user, would like to be able to use either a hardware-wrapped key
> > > > > or a
> > standard key.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > What we are looking for with these patches is for per-file/folder
> > encryption using fscrypt policies.
> > > > Cryptsetup to my understanding supports only full-disk , and does
> > > > not support FBE (File-Based)
> > >
> > > I must admit, I mostly used dm-crypt beforehand, so I had to look at
> > > fscrypt now. Some of my previous comments might not be fully
> > > applicable.
> > >
> > > > Hence the idea here is that we mount an unencrypted device (with
> > > > the inlinecrypt option that indicates inline encryption is
> > > > supported) And
> > specify policies (links to keys) for different folders.
> > > >
> > > > > > The way the UFS/EMMC crypto layer is designed currently is
> > > > > > that, this information is needed when the modules are loaded.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231104211259.17448-2-ebiggers@ke
> > > > > > rn el.org /#Z31drivers:ufs:core:ufshcd-crypto.c
> > > > >
> > > > > I see that the driver lists capabilities here. E.g. that it
> > > > > supports HW-wrapped keys. But the line doesn't specify that
> > > > > standard
> > keys are not supported.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Those are capabilities that are read from the storage controller.
> > > > However, wrapped keys Are not a standard in the ICE JEDEC
> > > > specification, and in most cases, is a value add coming from the SoC.
> > > >
> > > > QCOM SOC and firmware currently does not support both kinds of
> > > > keys in
> > the HWKM mode.
> > > > That is something we are internally working on, but not available yet.
> > >
> > > I'd say this is a significant obstacle, at least from my point of
> > > view. I understand that the default might be to use hw-wrapped keys,
> > > but it should be possible for the user to select non-HW keys if the
> > > ability to recover the data is considered to be important. Note, I'm
> > > really pointing to the user here, not to the system integrator. So
> > > using DT property or specifying kernel arguments to switch between
> > > these modes is not really an option.
> > >
> > > But I'd really love to hear some feedback from linux-security and/or
> > > linux-fscrypt here.
> > >
> > > In my humble opinion the user should be able to specify that the key
> > > is wrapped using the hardware KMK. Then if the hardware has already
> > > started using the other kind of keys, it should be able to respond
> > > with -EINVAL / whatever else. Then the user can evict previously
> > > programmed key and program a desired one.
> > >
> > > > > Also, I'd have expected that hw-wrapped keys are handled using
> > > > > trusted keys mechanism (see security/keys/trusted-keys/). Could
> > > > > you please point out why that's not the case?
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > I will evaluate this.
> > > > But my initial response is that we currently cannot communicate to
> > > > our TPM directly from HLOS, but goes through QTEE, and I don't
> > > > think our qtee currently interfaces with the open source tee
> > > > driver. The
> > interface is through QCOM SCM driver.
> > >
> > > Note, this is just an API interface, see how it is implemented for
> > > the CAAM hardware.
> > >
> >
> > The problem is that this patchset was sent out without the patches
> > that add the block and filesystem-level framework for hardware-wrapped
> > inline encryption keys, which it depends on.  So it's lacking context.
> > The proposed framework can be found at https://lore.kernel.org/linux-
> > block/20231104211259.17448-1-ebiggers@...nel.org/T/#u
> >
> 
> I have only been adding the fscryp patch link as part of the cover letter - as a
> dependency.
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240617005825.1443206-1-
> quic_gaurkash@...cinc.com/
> If you would like me to include it in the patch series itself, I can do that as
> well.
> 
> > As for why "trusted keys" aren't used, they just aren't helpful here.
> > "Trusted keys" are based around a model where the kernel can request
> > that keys be sealed and unsealed using a trust source, and the kernel
> > gets access to the raw unsealed keys.  Hardware-wrapped inline
> > encryption keys use a different model where the kernel never gets
> > access to the raw keys.  They also have the concept of ephemeral
> > wrapping which does not exist in "trusted keys".  And they need to be
> > properly integrated with the inline encryption framework in the block layer.
> >
> > - Eric
> 
> Regards,
> Gaurav

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